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Should the Definition of Oppressive
Conduct by Majority Shareholders
Exclude A Consideration of Ethical
Conduct and Business Purpose?
Sandra K. Miller*
I.

Introduction

The need to develop strategies to protect minority shareholders
from majority misconduct has long been recognized.' Many states
have adopted remedial legislation to address the special needs of the
minority shareholder of a closely-held corporation.'
* Assistant Professor, School of Management, Widener University.
1. For a landmark discussion of the difficulties encountered by minority shareholders,
see F. Hodge O'Neal, Close Corporations: Existing Legislation and Recommended Reform,
33 THE BUSINESS LAWYER 873 (1978) (reviewing the status of legislation for closely-held corporations and indicating the need to protect shareholders who fail to expressly contract for
protection); see J.E. Davidian, Corporate Dissolution in New York: Liberalizing the Rights of
Minority Shareholders, 56 ST. JOHNS L. REV. 25 (1981) (reviewing the development of New
York legislation enhancing the rights of minority shareholders); F.H. Easterbrook and D.R.
Fischel, Close Corporations and Agency Costs, 38 STAN. L. REV. 271 (1986) (reviewing the
cost of management of close corporations); V.B. Brudney and M.A. Chirelstein, A Restatement of Corporate Freezeouts, 87 YALE L.J. 1354 (1978) (classifying corporate freezeouts
largely from the perspective of public corporations, including a discussion of going private
transactions); R.H. Hillman, The Dissatisfied Participant In The Solvent Business Venture: A
Consideration of the Relative Permanence of Partnerships and Close Corporations, 67 MINN.
L. REV. 1, 75 (1982) (discussing the importance of expectations in close corporations).
2. See MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION CLOSE CORPORATION SUPPLEMENT at § 40
(1992) providing for judicial relief in part upon the occurrence of the following:
(a)(1) the directors or those in control of the corporation have acted, are acting,
or will act in a manner that is illegal, oppressive, fraudulent, or unfairly prejudicial to the petitioner, whether in his capacity as shareholder, director, or officer
of the corporation;
(2) the directors or those in control of the corporation are deadlocked in the
management of the corporation's affairs, the shareholders are unable to break
the deadlock, and the corporation is suffering or will suffer irreparable injury or
the business and affairs of the corporation can no longer be conducted to the
advantage of the shareholders generally because of the deadlock ....
A number of states have adopted some form of statutory relief specifically tailored for the
minority shareholder. Some states offer protection to minority shareholders not only in their
capacity as shareholders, directors, or officers, but also in their capacity as employees. See.
e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:12-7(l)(c) (West 1992) (permitting appointment of a custodian, a
provisional director or an order to sell the corporation stock. Dissolution is available where a
corporation has 25 or fewer shareholders, where the directors or those in control have acted
fraudulently or illegally, have mismanaged the corporation or have abused their authority as
officers, or have acted oppressively or unfairly toward minority shareholders in their capacities
as shareholders, directors, or officers or employees); see 15 PA. STAT. ANN. § 1767 (1992)
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The minority shareholder has traditionally been at risk when
shareholder disagreements have developed and the majority acts to
strip the minority of employment or participation in the governance
and management of the corporation.3 In response to the difficulties
encountered by minority shareholders, some states have-provided liberal dissenters' rights awarding minority shareholders the fair mar-

ket value of their shares.4
Many states have adopted statutes that borrow from the Model
(providing for the appointment of a custodian of a corporation on deadlock, or other causes
including where the directors or those in control of the corporation have acted illegally, oppressively, or fraudulently toward one or more holders or owners of 5 % or more of the outstanding
shares of any class of the corporation in their capacities as shareholders, directors, officers, or
employees). Under the Amended Comment-1990 to the Pennsylvania provision, it is indicated
that the Pennsylvania statute was modelled in part after New Jersey Law. The comment notes
that the extension of protection of minority shareholders in their capacity as employees departs
from the Model Business Corporation Act which eliminates relief in the capacity as employee
but continues relief for-officers. It has been observed that there is a striking similarity between
the New Jersey and Pennsylvania provision. J.W. MCLAMB, JR. AND W.C. SHIBA, PENNSYLVANIA CORPORATION LAW PRACTICE § 5.8, at 265, n.264 (1991); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8
§ 352(a)(1) (providing for the appointment of a custodian for a close corporation in part if the
business and affairs of the corporation are managed by the stockholders and they are so divided that the business of the corporation is suffering or is threatened with irreparable injury);
see also Steven C. Bahls, Resolving Shareholder Dissension: Selection of the Appropriate
Remedy, 15 J. OF CORPORATE LAW 285, 312-13 n.168-77 (1990) (indicating that most states
including those adopting the Model Business Corporation Act have adopted statutes permitting
dissolution upon deadlock or upon a showing of illegality, fraud, oppression, or the misapplication or waste of assets). Bahls indicates that some states such as California and New Jersey
give all corporations or minority shareholders the right to buy out minority shareholders when
a dissolution has been ordered. Other states such as Illinois, Maine, North Carolina, and
South Carolina provide an array of nonexclusive options in dissension cases. Other states have
adopted special remedies for statutory close corporations following The Model Business Corporation Act Statutory Close Corporation Supplement which provides equitable remedies less
severe than a mandatory dissolution.
3. See In re Kemp & Beatley, (Gardstein) Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1173, 1179 (N.Y. 1984)
(observing that "As the stock of closely held corporations generally is not readily salable, a
minority shareholder at odds with management policies may be without either a voice in protecting his or her interest or any reasonable means of withdrawing his or her investment."); see
also J.E. Davidian, Corporate Dissolution in New York: Liberalizing the Rights of Minority
Shareholders, 56 ST. JOHNS L. REV. 24, 27 (1981) noting:
To the participants' (the minorities') dismay, however disagreement ultimately
may develop and the minority shareholder may find himself removed from his
directorship, office, and employment by the action of the controlling faction
... .The shares of the close corporation typically do not return a dividend.
Moreover since a minority position in a close corporation, unlike its publicly held
counterpart, usually lacks marketability, the shareholder is frustrated by the realization that he cannot sell his shares.
4. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 262 (1992) (awarding appraisal rights in certain cases
involving mergers and consolidations); CAL. CORPORATIONS CODE § 1300 (1992); 15 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1901-1998 (West 1992) (permitting the award of the fair market value of
the shareholder's shares of a corporation to dissenting shareholders); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
tit. 15 § 1571 (a)(b) (generally providing for the payment of fair market value of shares of
stock to dissenting shareholders and outlining exception including shareholders holding certain
stock listed on the national securities exchange or held by more than 2,000 shareholders).

OPPRESSIVE CONDUCT

Business Corporation Act" and provide relief on the basis of deadlock; illegal, oppressive, or fraudulent conduct; or misapplication of
corporate assets.' In some cases, awarding shareholders the fair-market value of their shares may not make the shareholders whole.7 Minority shareholders may wish to continue participation in the business, or the corporation may have insufficient liquidity to award the
fair market value of shares. In such cases, the shareholder, desiring
continuation rather than dissolution, may actually seek the continuation of the corporation under the auspices of a provisional director or
custodian.'
The definition of "oppressive conduct" 9 that justifies corporate
dissolution or less drastic remedies is difficult to apply in many jurisdictions. While business corporation statutes may attempt to provide
certainty and clarity in the law to enhance the attractiveness of doing business, the definition of oppression has been left to judicial
construction on a case-by-case basis."0 Such an approach has been
5. See THE MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT ANN. § 13.01, Historical Background
p. 1359 (indicating that the Model Act requires the corporation to buy the shares of shareholders who object to the identified, extraordinary corporate transactions. The statutory comparison as of November 25, 1991 indicates that twenty-four jurisdictions have definition provisions similar to the Model Act including Arkansas, Colorado, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho,
Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska,
New Hampshire, North Carolina, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Eight additional jurisdictions include special
definition and terms including California, Connecticut, Florida, Kansas, Maryland, New
Jersey, and Ohio.).
6. Id.
7. See In re Kemp & Beatley (Gardstein) Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1173, 1178 (N.Y. 1984) in
which the court notes, "It is widely understood, that in addition to supplying capital to a
contemplated or ongoing enterprise and expecting a fair return, parties comprising the ownership of a close corporation may expect to be actively involved in its management and operation." Id.

§

8.

See, e.g., 4 MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ANN. MODEL CLOSE CORPORATION SUPPLEMENT

41(a)(6) at 1855 (1992) (providing for the appointment of a custodian to manage the business and the affairs of the corporation).
9. The definition of oppressive conduct is not synonymous with fraud or mismanagement. See White v. Perkins, 189 S.E.2d 315, 319 (Va. 1972) providing:
The word "oppressive," as used in the statute does not carry an essential inference of imminent disaster; it can contemplate a continuing course of conduct.
The word does not necessarily savor of fraud, and the absence of "mismanagement, or misapplication of assets," does not prevent a finding that the conduct of
the dominant directors or officers has been oppressive. It is not synonymous with
"illegal" and "fraudulent."
10. See, e.g., M.J. Sonnenfeld and K.M. Cuene, The New Pennsylvania Business Corporation Law: What Litigators Need To Know, 61 PBA QUARTERLY 31, observing with regard
to Pennsylvania's Business Corporation statute:
The new legislation was developed and sponsored by the Pennsylvania Bar Association to "further the Association's continuing effort to make [the Pennsylvania
corporation laws] as short, definite, clear and fair to management, shareholders
and creditors of corporations alike as is possible, and to constitute them the finest legislation on that subject in the country. This in turn will promote business
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suggested by the Model Close Corporation Supplement which expressly indicates that no attempt has been made to statutorily define
oppression, fraud or prejudicial conduct, leaving these "elastic

terms" to judicial interpretation."
The judicial construction of the definition of oppressive conduct
is well-suited to the diversified, fact-specific disputes among shareholders of closely-held corporations. However, the judicial development of a meaningful standard for defining oppressive conduct, apart
from fraud or mismanagement, is a difficult task. 2
in Pennsylvania and by Pennsylvania corporations, to the benefit of the Commonwealth and its citizens." The 1988 BCL thus has significant ramifications
not only for businesses incorporated in Pennsylvania but for out-of-state corporations as well.
In spite of the goal of clarity, Pennsylvania, for example, has left the definition of "oppressive
conduct" to judicial development pursuant to 15 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 1767(a)(2), 1981(a)(1),
and § 5981(2) (West 1992).
11. See 4 MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT. ANN., MODEL CLOSE CORPORATION SUPPLEMENT § 40 at 1853 (1992):
No attempt has been made to define oppression, fraud, or unfairly prejudicial
conduct. These are elastic terms whose meaning varies with the circumstances
presented in a particular case, and it is felt.that existing case law provides sufficient guidelines for courts and litigants.
Id. In some cases, state statutes echo the need for a case-by-case determination of oppressive
conduct. See, e.g., 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 1767 (1992) Amended Committee Comment-1990 providing:
This new provision [permitting the appointment of a custodian of corporation on
deadlock or other cause] is intended to establish a statutory foundation for the
development on a case-by-case basis of safeguards for incorporated partners in
dealing with each other rather than forcing the courts to distort the general rules
of corporate law in order to grant relief in closely-held situations.
Case law has largely recognized the highly factual nature of the determination of oppressive
conduct. See In re Kemp, 473 N.E.2d 1173, 1179 (N.Y. 1984) (involving an attempted minority squeeze-out of two former employees who petitioned for dissolution The Court of Appeals
indicated: "It would be inappropriate, however, for us in this case to delineate the contours of
the courts' consideration in determining whether directors have been guilty of oppressive conduct. As in other areas of the law, much will depend on the circumstances in the individual
case." Id. See also Fox v. 7L Bar Ranch, 645 P.2d 929, 933 (Montana 1982) (indicating that
generally, it is agreed that courts will proceed on a case by case basis, citing Skierka v,
Skierka Bros., Inc. 629 P.2d 214 (Montana 1981); Jackson v. St Regis Apartments, Inc., 565
S.W:2d 178 (Mo. App. 1978); and Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty Co. 400 A.2d 554 (N.J.
Super. 1979) (in which a minority shareholder who failed to learn the business and was an
unsatisfactory employee was denied petition for dissolution. Since the expectations of the parties were not established in any agreement they had to be gleaned from the facts. Exadaktilos,
400 A.2d at 561, 562.).
12. See John E. Davidian, CorporateDissolution in New York :Liberalizing the Rights
of Minority Shareholders, 56 ST. JOHNS LAW REV. 24, 59 (1981) (emphasizing the difficulties
caused by the failure to legislatively define oppressive conduct). Davidian notes:
Notwithstanding the manifestation of legislative intent to assure fairness to minority shareholders and protection against injury from oppressive conduct, the
enactments collectively fail to set forth standards determinative of the availability of the dissolution remedy. Indeed no statute, including section 1104a [regarding dissolutions under New York Law] attempts to define what is meant by
oppressive actions or conduct. Although any definition of the term may have
limited utility when applied to specific factual circumstances, such definition, at

OPPRESSIVE CONDUCT

A growing number of jurisdictions have adopted the reasonable
expectation test for defining oppressive conduct which triggers the
involuntary dissolution of a corporation or other less drastic equitable remedies such as the appointment of a custodian.1 3 Under this
a minimum, would provide the broad limits within which consideration of specific acts by the majority may be undertaken. Accordingly, an attempt should be
made to provide guidance to the judiciary regarding
those instances wherein the legislature envisioned the existence of
oppression.
The failure to statutorily specify the context in which oppressive conduct
exists may effectively injure both the majority and minority interests in the corporation. The potential for an unduly broad judicial interpretation of oppression
may infringe upon what would otherwise be freedom of corporate action. The
controlling interest may unnecessarily temper their business judgment by the
coercive force of fear of dissolution at a later point in time. Although it is recognized that the "availability of dissolution as a remedy for oppression is a strong
deterrent to an oppressive majority, it is equally apparent that even innocent
"'directors and controlling shareholders may be forced to make their business
judgments more with an eye toward avoiding a violation of that vague standard
than toward serving the best interest of the corporation.
Id. (citations omitted). See also Bahls, supra note 2, at 286 (indicating that commentators
have not assessed the standards courts should use to select the most appropriate equitable
remedy).
13. See Gee v. Blue Stone Heights Hunting Club, Inc. 604 A.2d 1141 (Pa. Commw.
1992) (involving a petition to dissolve a non-profit hunting club on the grounds that the organizational rules resulting in the members' expulsion were oppressive. The organizational rules
required the payment of annual dues and hosting of an annual meeting. The organization's
procedures failed to inform the petitioners of their lapse in membership. The fair market value
of the organization rose due to appreciation in real estate held by the organization, making
membership in the organization and petitioners sought a dissolution of the club. The Commonwealth court embraced the reasonable expectation standard for defining oppressive conduct,
and denied the petition.). Balvik v. Sylvester, 411 N.W.2d 383, 387-89 (N.Dakota 1987) (involving a dispute between two individuals who had incorporated their electrical contracting
business. The majority shareholder owned 70 percent of the stock while the minority held 30
percent. As the result of differences in philosophy of management of the corporation the minority shareholder was fired and instituted a suit for dissolution. The Supreme Court of North
Dakota measured the alleged oppressive conduct in light of fiduciary duty and reasonable expectation concepts. In so doing the court held that the trial court abused its discretion in
ordering the extreme remedy of dissolution); see McCauley v. McCauley 724 P.2d 232, 237241 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986) (involving a suit for dissolution by a minority shareholder who
owned a combined minority interest with her husband in her husband's family ranching corporation. After she and her husband experienced marital difficulties she was ousted from her
position on the board, denied a voice in management, and no longer received corporate benefits. The court applied the reasonable expectation analysis and ultimately concluded that the
defendants engaged in oppressive conduct); see In re Kemp, 473 N.E.2d 1173 (N.Y. 1984)
(involving two minority shareholder/employees one of whom was fired and the other retired.
The shareholders claimed that the majority engaged in oppressive conduct by changing a longstanding dividend-paying policy to a system which paid dividends only based on services rendered. The Court adopted the reasonable expectation test for defining oppressive conduct); see
Fox v. 7L Bar Ranch Co., 645 P.2d 929, 933 (Montana 1982) (involving three family-owned
corporations engaged in various facets of farming and real estate ownership. The petitioner
was a shareholder of a corporation in which he owned only a 25 percent interest, which in turn
controlled a corporation in which he had a fifty percent interest, thus making the cash flow of
his 50% company captive of his 25% owned corporation. Having received no dividends or
remuneration of any kind, the petitioner sought dissolution on the basis of planned oppressive
conduct designed to deprive him of his rightful portion of corporate holdings and profits.
The shareholder conflict apparently arose out of deep-seated family animosity. While recogniz-

97

DICKINSON

LAW REVIEW

WINTER 1993

test, oppressive conduct occurs when the majority's conduct substantially defeats expectations that, when objectively viewed, are reasonable under the circumstances and are central to the minority shareholder's decision to join the particular business venture. The
reasonable expectation standard for determining oppressive conduct
has been embraced as a means of protecting the minority shareholder who lacks liquidity and who is overpowered by the shareholders with majority control. ' Yet
significant problems remain with the
15
test.
expectation
reasonable
ing the existence of a number of definitions of oppressive conduct, the Montana Supreme
Court embraced the reasonable expectation and affirmed the granting of the dissolution standard indicating "[b]ecause of the special circumstances underlying closely held corporations,
courts must determine the expectations of the shareholders concerning their respective roles in
corporate affairs. These expectations must be gleaned from the evidence presented."); see also
Capital Toyota, Inc. v. Gervin, 381 So.2d 1038, 1039 (Miss. 1980) (involving a petition for
dissolution of a corporation by a 25 percent minority shareholder. The parties agreed that the
minority shareholder who was the general manager of a car dealership would be employed by
the dealership at the time of the retirement of its debt, with some exceptions. The agreement
further provided that if the minority shareholder ceased to be employed for any reason whatsoever, his 25 percent stock interest could be purchased at book value. The dealership was sold
and the agreement was assigned to the new owners who subsequently terminated the minority
shareholder. The Supreme Court of Mississippi reversed the lower court's grant of dissolution
finding that exceptional factors warranting dissolution were not present in the case but rather,
the minority's remedy should be the book value of the stock. The court found the reasonable
expectation standard helpful in considering whether oppression has taken place); see Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551, 562-63 (N.C. 1983) (involving a suit by a minority shareholder for dissolution of a family-owned corporation. Petitioner's father had given him only
29.82 percent of the family corporations while giving majority control to petitioner's younger
brother. The younger brother fired petitioner and petitioner commenced an action for dissolution. The court noted that under North Carolina law relief will be granted to the minority
shareholder who has the burden of proving that his rights or interests as a shareholder are
being contravened. The court held that a complaining shareholder's rights or interest in a close
corporation include the "reasonable expectations" the complaining shareholder has in the corporation); Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty Co., 400 A.2d 554 (N.J. 1979), afl'd, 414 A.2d
994 (1980) (indicating special circumstances, arrangements and personal relationships underlying the formation of close corporations generate certain expectations which must be gleaned
from the facts to assess whether controlling shareholders have acted oppressively); see also
Bahls, supra note 2, at 321 n.217 (quoting 2 F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 9.03, at 9-141 (1988) "One of the most significant trends in the law of close corporations in recent years is the increasing willingness of courts to look to the reasonable expectations of shareholders to determine whether 'oppression' or similar grounds exist as a
justification for involuntary dissolution or another remedy" ).
14. See In re Kemp & Beatley, (Gardstein) Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1173, 1179 (N.Y. 1984)
(observing that the stock of closely held corporations is not readily salable and that the minority may have no reasonable means of withdrawing his or her investment).
15. See S.C. Bahls, Resolving Shareholder Dissension: Selection of the Appropriate
Equitable Remedy, THE J. OF CORPORATION LAW, 285, 326-27 (indicating some shortcomings
with the reasonable expectation standard including situations where the intent of the shareholder is personal in nature, and where the minority shareholder involved is not the original
shareholder, but rather one's son, daughter, ex-spouse, or other transferee. Bahls further notes
that the reasonable expectation test may be inappropriate where business conditions have
changed so much that reasonable expectations can no longer be fulfilled). See also R.W. Hillman, The Dissatisfied Participant in the Solvent Business Venture: A Consideration of the
Relative Permanence of Partnerships and Close Corporations, 67 MINN. L. REv. 1, 77 (1982)

OPPRESSIVE CONDUCT

While well-suited for the small "mom and pop" closely-held
corporation, the reasonable expectation test fails to address the
problems faced by larger, closely-held corporations. These corporations, which have a major impact on the local community, may have
competing minority shareholders with conflicting reasonable expectations.16 Basically, this test makes it difficult for majority shareholders to define their relationship with minority shareholders. 17 Written
shareholder agreements and pre-planning efforts are useful, but are
not necessarily controlling, and frequently become out-dated. They
may be impossible to modify before a majority shareholder dispute
arises."
In evaluating whether majority shareholder conduct is oppressive, the reasonable expectation standard fails to incorporate the business judgment rule. While relief may be denied to minority share(suggesting the need for limitations under an expectations-based analysis, including a showing
by the dissatisfied participant that "I) he or she became a participant because of a substantial
expectation or set of expectations known or assumed by the other participants; 2) that the
prospect that the expectation will be achieved is unlikely; and 3) that the failure to achieve the
expectation was in large part beyond the control of the participant."). Id.
16. In the context of a large close corporation, it is possible for minority shareholders to
have conflicting interests. The impact of granting relief upon others in the corporation and
upon other shareholders should not be overlooked in the determination of whether relief should
be granted. Justice Martin, in a concurring opinion in Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d
551, 572-73 (N.C. 1983) notes:
The court should also consider what effect the granting of relief will have upon
the corporation and other shareholders. Will it interfere with the corporation's
ability to attract additional capital? Will it interfere with the rights of creditors?
If a buy-out of plaintiffs shares is forced upon the company, it may be far from
painless. If it is determined that the granting of relief will be unduly burdensome
to the corporation or other shareholders, the trial court should consider this in
determining whether to grant relief ....
17. See F. Hodge O'Neal, Close Corporations:Existing Legislation and Recommended
Reform, 33 THE BUSINEss LAWYER 872, 881 (1978) (observing that "'[s]tatutory protection is
needed for minority shareholders who fail to bargain for and obtain protective contractual
arrangements"). The underlying premise of the reasonable expectation standard rests largely
on the perceived need to protect minority shareholders who have not entered into shareholder
agreements or whose agreements fail to adequately protect them. However, there may well be
situations where both majority and minority shareholders have excellent legal counsel and are
represented by sophisticated business planners. This may be particularly true for larger, profitable close corporations which are in the enviable position of remaining closely held, or going
public. In situations involving well-represented majority and minority shareholders, the specter
of a court's substitution of its judgment of the parties' reasonable expectations as embodied in
carefully planned shareholder documents may create a great deal of uncertainty.
18. Unlike a contract for the sale of goods or services which may involve a single transaction or a series of transactions, a shareholder agreement governs long-term relationships
among shareholders in the operation of an ongoing business involving a multitude of daily
transactions and interactions among shareholders. While the reasonable expectation concept
rooted in contract law may be well-suited for the isolated transaction which is the subject of a
single contract, it is more difficult to apply in the fluid setting of the operation of an ongoing
business. See R.W. Hillman, The Dissatisfied Participantin the Solvent Business Venture: A
Considerationof the Relative Permanence of Partnershipsand Close Corporations,67 MINN.
L. REV. 1, 77 (1982) (outlining the need for limitations upon the expectation analysis).
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holders whose behavior justifies the majority's conduct, the test is

not well-suited for situations when both minority conduct is reasonable and the majority has valid reasons for taking actions to the detriment of the aggrieved minority. 9
Further, the exclusive employment of the reasonable expectation
test fails to incorporate a balancing of ethical considerations in evaluating majority and minority conduct.20 Shareholder disputes involving attempted minority squeeze-outs may raise ethical issues among
relatives.2 1 Broken promises, unconscionable bargains, and angry retaliation in the context of divorce are typical.2" In today's business
milieu, wide-spread concerns exist over ethics and social responsibil19. This problem raises the issue of the extent to which the business judgment rule
should apply in the context of claims based on oppressive majority shareholder conduct in the
context of closely-held corporations.
20. See In re Kemp, 473 N.E.2d 1173, 1179 (N.Y. 1984) (utilizing a complaining
shareholder's reasonable expectations as a means of identifying and measuring conduct alleged
to be oppressive). The exclusive employment of the reasonable expectation test as a measure of
oppressive conduct fails to expressly incorporate concepts of the fiduciary duty of good faith
and fair dealing owed by majority shareholders to minority shareholders, and also fails to
acknowledge ethical responsibilities to others who are not a party to the dispute. Contrast,
Kisner v. Coffey, 418 So.2d 58, 61 (Miss. 1982) in which the court states:
[w]e agree, however, that the question of what is "oppressive" conduct by those
in control of a "close" corporation as its majority shareholders is closely related
to what we agree to be the fiduciary duty of a good faith and fair dealing owed
by them to its minority shareholders.
Thus, an abuse of corporate position for private gain at the expense of the
\stockholders is "oppressive" conduct. Or the plundering of a "close corporation"
by the siphoning off of the profits by excessive salaries or bonus payments and
the operation of the business for the sole benefit of the majority of the stockholders, to the detriment of the minority stockholders, would constitute such "oppressive" conduct as to authorize a dissolution of the corporation under the terms of
ORS 57.-595.
21. See, e.g., Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551, 553 (N.C. 1983) (involving
difficult dispute between two brothers); see also McCauley v. McCauley, 724 P.2d 232, 235
(N.M. App. 1986) (arising in the context of a bitter and acrimonious divorce in which the
minority shareholder was ousted from her position on the board of directors of the corporation
and was also denied lodging, food, transportation and other economic advantages in connection
with the cow-calf ranching operation).
22. See Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty Co., 400 A.2d 544 (N.J. Super. 1979), afl'd,
414 A.2d 994 (N.J. 1986) (involving a father-in-law who helped his son-in-law invest in a
closely-held restaurant business, but the son-in-law failed to learn the business, and the marriage experienced difficulties); see also S.C. Bahls, Resolving Shareholder Dissension: Selection of the Appropriate Equitable Remedy, 15 THE J. OF CORPORATE LAW, 285, 287 (1990)
observing:
[iun a study by John L. Ward of Loyola University of Chicago, eighty percent of
the Chicago area family-owned corporations that were in existence in 1924 and
had at least twenty employees were no longer going concerns in 1984. Some of
the major reasons for the business failure of closely held businesses are "typical
family problems [such] as sibling rivalry [and] competition between generations" that result in shareholder dissension and corporate succession problems
(footnote omitted).
The study discussed by Bahls at notes 10 and II is by J. WARD, KEEPING THE FAMILY BusiNESS HEALTHY xv, at 2, 247-50, and at 3 (1987).

OPPRESSIVE CONDUCT

ity in the conduct of business. Yet, in an area of the law involving
breaches of ethical responsibility, ethical considerations and social
responsibility have been minimized in oppressive conduct and in considering remedies such as the reasonable expectation test.2 3
Finally, the reasonable expectation test fails to incorporate the
interests of non-shareholders who may have an interest in the continuation of the corporation. 24 Particularly when there are many employees, or when the nature of the business affects public health or
safety, non-shareholders may have an interest in the outcome of a
minority shareholder dispute. 5 The reasonable expectation standard
23. The focus on the bargain struck between majority and minority shareholders and
departures from this bargain as a test of oppressive conduct is best illustrated in In re Kemp &
Beatley (Gardstein) Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1173, 1179 (N.Y. 1984) in which the court provides:
Given the nature of close corporations and the remedial purpose of the statute,
this court holds that utilizing a complaining shareholders "reasonable expectations" as a means of identifying and measuring conduct alleged to be oppressive
is appropriate. A court considering a petition alleging oppressive conduct must
investigate what the majority shareholders knew, or should have known, to be
the petitioner's expectations in entering the particular enterprise. Majority conduct should not be deemed oppressive simply because the petitioner's subjective
hopes and desires in joining the venture are not fulfilled. Disappointment alone
should not necessarily be equated with oppression.
Rather, oppression should be deemed to arise only when the majority conduct substantially defeats expectations that, objectively viewed, were both reasonable under the circumstances and were central to the petitioner's decision to
join the venture.
It is suggested that this approach, if exclusively employed, removes from the analysis a consideration of the nature of the majority's conduct, irrespective of the bargain between the parties.
It is conceivable that majority conduct can be egregious even if it does not depart specifically
from the reasonable expectations flowing from the bargain between the parties. The focus on
the reasonable expectations flowing from the bargain sanitizes the analysis and side-steps the
difficult problem of formulating a viable judicial standard to evaluate majority conduct objectively in light of social norms and considerations of fiduciary duty and social responsibility.
24. Id. at 1179. It is noteworthy that the Kemp decision makes no mention of the impact
of the resolution of the dispute and the potential dissolution or less drastic remedies upon the
corporation itself or third parties. Further, while the Model Close Corporation Supplement
provides an array of remedies for oppressive conduct, it fails to expressly incorporate a consideration of the public interest or third party interests in weighing possible alternatives. See also
R.W. Hillman, The Dissatisfied Participantin the Solvent Business Venture: A Consideration
of the Relative Permanence of Partnerships and Close Corporations, 67 MINN. L. REV. 1, at
75 (1982) observing: ". . . the [the reasonable expectation analysis] not only significantly departs from the fault-based oppression standard, with which there is societal experience, but
also improperly ignores the expectations of participants other than the dissatisfied
shareholders."
25. In re Kemp, 473 N.E.2d at 1176 (indicating that the business concern of Kemp &
Beatley was a well-established manufacturing concern which designed and manufactured linens and sundry tabletop items. The business had been established for over 40 years since one
of the petitioners had been employed by the company for over 40 years. No mention is made of
the impact of a possible dissolution on the employees of the manufacturing business nor is any
consideration given to the impact upon the local economy or to the interests of creditors or
other third parties who may have an interest in the continuation of the business enterprise);
but see the concurring opinion of Justice Martin in Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551,
572 (N.C. 1983) (acknowledging to some extent that the corporation as an entity and third
parties in particular may be affected by the remedy granted, noting in part "[t]he court should
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fails to consider the corporation's social responsibilities and the way
in which the resolution of a minority shareholder dispute may affect
the public interest.26
This article reviews the development of the reasonable expectation test,27 the status of state legislation on oppressive conduct, and
the current judicial application of the reasonable expectation test.
This article also identifies problems in applying the standard, and
suggests an alternative formulation that incorporates reasonable expectations as one of several prongs in an analysis of oppressive conduct.28 The proposed model incorporates ethical considerations and
business purpose in defining oppressive conduct. It further suggests
that statutory changes may be necessary so that ethical considerations, business purpose, and social responsibilities are not ignored in
determining whether a mifiority shareholder should be granted rights
29
to an involuntary dissolution.

II.

Oppressive Conduct Based on Fault

Early precedents defined oppressive conduct as a departure from
notions of fair play and fair dealing.3" These cases used a fault-based
approach. They placed emphasis on the departure from proper business conduct. Fiduciary duty was recognized as a closely-related
concept.
In the case of Central Standard Life Insurance Co. v. Davis,
the court recognized oppressive conduct as a cause of action.31 The
court recognized that oppression is a concept separate and distinct
from fraud or mismanagement and that it does not necessarily require an allegation of imminent disaster.3 2
In an effort to establish a viable judicial standard, the Supreme
Court of Virginia in White v. Perkins, Inc.,3 3 borrowed from a British formulation of oppressive conduct. This formulation defines oppressive conduct as:
also consider what effect the granting of relief will have upon the corporation and other shareholders. Will it require burdensome financing upon the corporation or shareholders? Will it
interfere with the rights of creditors?).
26. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d at 572.
27. See infra notes 39-49 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 132-57, 161-70 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 169-70 and accompanying text.
30. White v. Perkins, 180 S.E.2d 315, 319-20 (Va. 1972) (quoting English authorities
which in part define oppressive conduct as a viable departure from standards of fair dealing).
31. 141 N.E.2d 45, 49 (Ill. 1957).
32. Id.
33. 189 S.E.2d 315 (Va. 1972).
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a visible departure from the standards of fair dealing, and a violation of fair play on which every shareholder who entrusts his
money to a company is entitled to rely. Elder v. Elder & Watson Ltd., (1952) Sess. Cas. 49, 55. It has also been held to mean
"a lack of probity and fair dealing in the affairs of a com34
pany to the prejudice of some of its members.
The Supreme Court of Oregon, in Baker v. Commercial Body
Builders,35 acknowledged the above formulation as the most widelyquoted definition of oppressive conduct. The court indicated that the
question of oppressive conduct is closely related to the fiduciary duty
of good faith and fair dealing owed by the majority to the
minority. 6
Perhaps the most noteworthy and eloquent description of the fiduciary duty that majority shareholders owe to the minority shareholder is found in an opinion by Chief Justice Traynor:
majority shareholders, either singly or acting in concert to accomplish a joint purpose, have a fiduciary responsibility to the
minority and to the corporation to use their ability to control the
corporation in a fair, just and equitable manner. Majority shareholders may not use their power to control corporate activities to
benefit themselves alone or in a manner detrimental to the minority. Any use to which they put their power to control the
corporation must benefit all shareholders proportionately and
must not conflict with the proper conduct of the corporation's
37
business.
The fault-based definition of oppressive conduct has come under
attack because of the difficulty in defining such concepts as "fair
dealing" and "fair play." The terms "fair dealing" and "fair play"
require a meaningful judicial definition.3 8
34. Id. at 319-20 (involving an appeal from a dissolution decree. The petitioner was a
minority shareholder owning 45 percent of a company formed primarily to act as a jobber for
product of American Oil Company. The remaining 55 percent was held by another individual.
The shareholders were required to report corporate earnings in their individual returns under a
Subchapter S election. Because the majority shareholder refused to do so the company never
paid a dividend to the shareholders. Numerous conflicts arose between the shareholders culminating in the minority's petition. Finding the majority's conduct susceptible to more than one
interpretation, the Supreme court of Virginia affirmed the trial court's denial of the petition.);
see also Scottish Co-op Wholesale Society Ltd. v. Meyer (1958); 3 All. E.R. 66, 86 (H.L.).
35. 507 P.2d 387 (Or. 1973).
36. Id. at 393-94.
37. Jones v. H.F. Ahamanson & Co., 460 P.2d 464, 471 (Cal. 1969) (citations omitted).
38. See Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty Co., 400 A.2d 554, 560 (N.J. Super. 1979)
(indicating that the prior approach fails to suggest any perspective from which to judge what
is oppressive or unfair).
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III. The Defeat of Reasonable Expectations as a Definition of Oppressive Conduct
Because of the difficulty in extending adequate protection to minority shareholders, several scholars redefined oppressive conduct to
focus not on a departure from "fair play" and "fair dealing," but on
a departure from the bargain struck by the majority and minority
shareholders. 39 This approach defines oppressive conduct as a violation of reasonable expectations of the minority. The reasonable expectation test developed from the concern for the minority shareholder in a closely-held corporation who failed to obtain protection
from the majority's overreaching conduct. A leading authority on
closely-held businesses, F. Hodge O'Neal,4 0 notes:
Many participants in closely-held corporations are "little people," unsophisticated in business and financial matters. Not uncommonly a participant in a closely-held enterprise invests all
his assets in the business with the expectation, often reasonable
under the circumstances even in the absence of an express contract, that he will be a key employee in the company and will
have a voice in business decisions. When courts apply the principle of majority rule in close corporations, they often disappoint
the reasonable expectations of minority participants. 1
Professor O'Neal uses English precedents in developing the reasonable expectation standard. 42 Professor O'Neal also referred to
Australian precedents that describe the duties of controlling shareholders as follows:
[acts], which in law are a valid exercise of powers conferred by the articles may nevertheless be .entirely outside
what can fairly be regarded as having been in contemplation of the parties when they become members of the company. Even when there has been nothing done in excess of
power it is necessary to consider whether the situation
39. See F. Hodge O'Neal, Close Corporations: Existing Legislation and Recommended
Reform, 33 THE BUSINESS LAWYER 873, 883, and 885 (1978) (recommending the application
of the reasonable expectation test as a measure of oppressive conduct, and referring to Professor J.A.C. Hetherington who had suggested that a minority shareholder in a close corporation,
even though he has not bargained for the privilege of withdrawing from the business, should
nevertheless, if he decides he wants to dispose of his interest, be able to liquidate his investment by either the right to compel a dissolution or through the right to require the other
shareholders of the corporation to buy his shares for a fair price).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 883.
42. Id. at 885 (discussing a 1972 decision of the House of Lords, Ebrahimi v. Westbourne Galleries Ltd. [1973] A.C. [1972] 2 W.L.R. 1289, [1972] 2 All E.R. 492).
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which has arisen is not quite outside what the parties contemplated . . . and whether what has been done is not
contrary to the assumptions which were the foundation of
their agreement."
O'Neal adopted Professor J.A.C. Hetherington's" recommendation that minority shareholders of a close corporation should be able
to liquidate their investment for a fair market price. Hetherington
also argued that minority shareholders should be allowed to compel
corporate dissolution, or to require other shareholders to buy their
shares even if such matters were not expressly part of the bargain
between the majority and minority shareholders. 5 O'Neal emphasized that courts should protect the reasonable expectations of persons acquiring an interest in a close corporation, irrespective of
whether various issues were part of the express bargain between the
parties."
In discussing the evolution of the reasonable expectation standard, the Supreme Court of North Carolina noted in Meiselman v.
Meiselman 7 that legislatures enacted statutes liberalizing remedies
for the minority shareholder largely in response to the commentators' calls for reform.4 8 Many states have adopted statutes that borrow from the Model Business Corporation Act and that provide relief on the basis of deadlock, illegal, oppressive or fraudulent
conduct; or misapplication of corporate assets."9
43. Id. at 887 quoting In re Wondoflex Textiles Pty., (1951) VIcT. L.R. 458, 467.
44. F. Hodge O'Neal, Close Corporations: Existing Legislation and Recommended Reform, 33 THE BUSINESS LAWYER 873, 883 (1978).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 885; see also F. O'Neal & R. Thompson, 2 CLOSE CORPORATIONS, sec. 9.29
at ch. 9 (3rd ed. 1988) indicating:
[t]he reasonable expectation standard leads a court to examine the perils faced
by participants in a close corporation who have concentrated their financial and
human resources in an intimate ongoing business relationship which offers no
easy out when dissension develops. By focusing on the reasonable expectations of
the participants, courts have a clearer, more specific standard to apply in resolving disputes in closely held enterprises (footnotes omitted).
47. 307 S.E.2d 551, 560 (N.C. 1983).
48: Id.
49. See supra note 2; see also O'Neal & R. Thompson, supra note 46, at 9.29, p. 135
stating:
[i]nclusion in statutes of terms such as "oppression" or "unfairly prejudicial"
and the courts' tendency to focus on the reasonable expectations of shareholders
undoubtedly have lowered the threshold at which courts will provide relief to
minority shareholders. This trend is furthered by statutes which specifically authorize relief other than dissolution and by judicial willingness to provide alternative relief. Such statutory language and judicial interpretations accomplish
what has been explicitly done by statute in Britain, that is, severing the remedies
for oppression from the traditional remedy of winding up, and encouraging
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Current Status of Legislation for Close-Corporations

Virtually all states have adopted liberalizing provisions designed
wholly or partially for closely-held corporations." Delaware has
taken a lead in the enactment of close-corporation legislation. 5 1 Kan53
5
sas and Pennsylvania have adopted similar legislation. Georgia,
courts to intervene and grant relief in circumstances that traditionally would not
have supported dissolution.
50. See supra note 2; see also F. O'Neal & R. Thompson, CLOSE CORPORATIONS, §
9.29, p. 131 (stating "[m]ost American jurisdictions now permit a shareholder to petition for
dissolution on grounds which involve misconduct by those in control of the corporation. Illegality, fraud, misapplication of assets or waste are listed as grounds for involuntary dissolution in
most states.").
51. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 341-356. The statutory close corporation provisions are
elective. Section 341(a) provides that:
[tihis subchapter [on close corporations] applies to all close corporations, as defined in section 342 of this title. Unless a corporation elects to become a close
corporation under this subchapter in the manner prescribed in this subchapter, it
shall be subject in all respects to this chapter, except this subchapter.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 341(a) (emphasis added). The Delaware statute contains provisions
for the voluntary termination of close corporation status, and for involuntary termination of
close corporation status in section 346 and 348. Section 352 contains provisions for the appointment of a custodian in the event that the business and affairs of the corporation are
managed by the stockholders and they are so divided that the business is suffering or is
threatened with irreparable injury and any remedy with respect to such deadlock provided in
the certificate of incorporation or bylaws or in any written agreement of the stockholders has
failed; or the petitioner has a right to the dissolution of the corporation under a provision of
the certificate of incorporation under section 355 which grants the shareholders the motion to
dissolve upon will pursuant to the certificate of incorporation. Pursuant to section 355 stockholders have an option to provide in the certificate of incorporation that any stockholder, or the
holders of any specified number or percentage of shares of any class of stock can exercise an
option to dissolve at will. Section 353 provides for the appointment of a provisional director in
certain circumstances including deadlock, notwithstanding any contrary provision in the certificate of incorporation or the bylaws or agreement of the stockholders.
52. See KAN CORP. ANN. § 17-7201-7216 (1988). Section 17-7201 makes the statutory
close corporation provisions elective, as in Delaware. Section 17-7212 provides for the appointment of a custodian in part were the business and affairs of the stockholders are managed by
the stockholders and they are so divided that the business of the corporation is suffering or is
threatened with irreparable injury, and any remedy with respect to such deadlock provided in
the articles of incorporation or bylaws or in any written agreement of the stockholders has
failed. Section 17-7213 provides for a provisional director as well; see also PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. tit. 15 § 2333 (West 1992) which provides for the appointment of a custodian or a
provisional director. Pursuant to § 2337 bylaws may include a provision granting shareholders
the right to dissolve at will. 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2337 (West 1992).
53. GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-902 (1990) defines a statutory close corporation as follows:
(a) A statutory close corporation is a corporation whose articles of incorporation
contain a statement that the corporation is a statutory close corporation.
(b) A corporation having 50 or fewer shareholders may become a statutory close
corporation . ...
Section 14-2-940 provides for court action to protect a shareholder of a statutory close corporation where the following occurs:
1) the directors or those in control of the corporation have acted, are acting, or
will act in a manner that is illegal, oppressive fraudulent, or unfairly prejudicial
to the petitioner, whether in his capacity as shareholder, director, or officer of
the corporation;
2) The directors or those in control of the corporation are deadlocked in the
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South Carolina,5 4 and Wisconsin5 5 have adopted in whole or in part
the Model Statutory Close Corporation Supplement. Other states,
including Arizona 56 and Maryland,5 7 have adopted different variamanagement of the corporation's affairs, the shareholders are unable to break
the deadlock, and the corporation is suffering or will suffer irreparable injury or
the business and affairs of the corporation can no longer be conducted to the
advantage of the shareholders generally because of the deadlock;
(3) there existsone or more grounds for judicial dissolution of the corporation
under Code § 14-2:1430.
GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-940 (1990).
Three categories of relief are provided including ordinary relief, extraordinary relief for
share purchase, and extraordinary relief for dissolution. Section 14-2-941 provides for ordinary
relief which includes nine types of remedies ranging from the performance, prohibition, alteration or setting aside of any action of the corporation or of its shareholders, directors, or officers
of or any other party to the proceeding, to the removal from office of any director or officer, to
the ordering of an accounting with respect to any matter in dispute. GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2941 (1990).
Section 14-2-942 provides for the purchase of shares for fair market value in part where
ordinary relief is inadequate or inappropriate. Further, Section 14-2-943 provides for judicial
dissolution where the two options for ordinary relief fail to resolve the matters in dispute. GA.
CODE ANN. § 14-2-941 (1990).
54. South Carolina's statutory close corporation provisions differ somewhat from Georgia's. For example, the 50 shareholder limit was not adopted in South Carolina. See S.C. CODE
ANN. § 33-18-103 (1990) Official Comment.
55. Wisconsin's statutory scheme generally follows the Model Act. Shareholders have
the option to dissolve the corporation at will or upon the occurrence of any specified event or
contingency. WIs. STAT. ANN § 180.1831 (West 1992). Section 180.1833 provides that the
power of the court to grant relief is based in part on whether directors or those in control of
the corporation have acted, are acting or will act in a manner that is illegal, oppressive, fraudulent or unfairly prejudicial to the petitioner in his capacity as a shareholder, director or officer
of the corporation, or where the directors or those in control are so divided that the shareholders are unable to break the deadlock and irreparable injury will result. Section 180.1833 sets
forth a number of types of relief such as enjoining any resolution or other act of the statutory
close corporation, or requiring an accounting or removing certain officers or directors. A broad
array of remedies are provided. Provision is also made for the appointment of a provisional
director, the ordering of court dissolution in certain cases, or awarding damages, or share
purchase. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 180-1833 (West 1992).
56. Arizona's provisions are somewhat different. The articles of incorporation of a close
corporation may provide for arbitration of any deadlock or dispute involving the internal affairs of the corporation. Unless otherwise provided in the articles of incorporation if the arbitrators determine that a deadlock or dispute impairs or threatens to impair the assets or continued conduct of the business of the corporation, the arbitrators have the power to appoint a
conservator or to continue the operation of the business of the corporation, or both during the
pendency of the arbitration proceedings. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-206 and 10-214
(West 1990). Provisions are also made for the involuntary dissolution or liquidation of the
corporation notwithstanding the arbitration provisions. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-215
(West 1990).
57. See MD. CORPS. & Ass'NS. CODE ANN. § 3-413 (1992) containing a special provision
for stockholders with 25 percent voting power. Stockholders with such voting power may petition the court for dissolution on the following grounds:
(1) The directors are so divided respecting the management of the corporation's
affairs that the votes required for action by the board cannot be obtained;
(2) The directors are so divided that the directors cannot be elected:
(b) By any stockholder with voting power. Any stockholder entitled to
vote in the election of directors of a corporation may petition a court of
equity to dissolve the corporation on grounds that:
(1) The stockholders are so divided that they have failed, for a
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tions of the Model Statutory Close Corporation Supplement.
The Model Statutory Close Corporation Supplement contains
several provisions regarding corporate dissolution. In Section 33, the
articles of incorporation are permitted to provide for dissolution at
will or upon the occurrence of a specified event or contingency. 58 The
Official Comments note that the purpose of this provision is to permit the shareholders the same power to dissolve the business as general partners have under the Uniform Partnership Act. This provision responds to long-standing criticism that many small, closelyheld corporations are essentially incorporated partnerships and the
shareholders should have powers to dissolve at will. 59
Section 40 of the Model Statutory Close Corporation Act 60 authorizes court action to protect shareholders. Court action may be
obtained if the directors or those in control of the corporation have
acted, or will act, in a manner which is illegal, oppressive, fraudulent, or unfairly prejudicial to the petitioner, whether the petitioner
is a shareholder, director, or officer.6 1 The Official Comments specifically note that the meaning of these elastic terms is expressly left for
judicial interpretation.6 2 Judicial relief may also be obtained whenever there is a deadlock in the management of the corporation's affairs, the shareholders are unable to break the deadlock, and the corporation is suffering or will suffer irreparable injury or the business
affairs of the corporation can no longer be conducted to the advantage of shareholders generally because of the deadlock.6"
Two levels of judicial relief may be obtained if the conditions of
Section 40 have been satisfied. Section 41 provides for ordinary relief
and Section 42 provides for extraordinary relief. Ordinary relief
includes:
1) The performance, prohibition, alteration, or setting aside of
any action of the corporation or of its shareholders, directors,
officers, or of any other party to the proceeding;
period which includes at least two consecutive annual meeting
dates, to elect successors to directors whose terms would have expired on the election and qualification of their successors; or
(2) The acts of the directors or those in control of the corporation
are illegal, oppressive, or fraudulent.
58. MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION CLOSE CORPORATION SUPPLEMENT, § 33 at 18481849 (1992).
59. Id. § 33 Official Comment at 1849-1850.
60. Id. § 40 at 1850-1851.
61. Id.§ 40, at 1850-1851.
62. MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION CLOSE CORPORATION SUPPLEMENT, § 40 Official
Comment at 1852-55.
63. Id.§ 40, at 1850.
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2) the cancellation or alteration of any provision in the corporation's articles of incorporation or bylaws;
3) the removal from office of any director or officer;
4) the appointment of any individual as a director or officer;
5) an accounting with respect to any matter in dispute;
6) the appointment of a custodian to manage the business and
affairs of the corporation;
7) the appointment of a provisional director (who has the rights,
powers, and duties of a duly elected director, to serve for the
term and under the conditions prescribed by the court;
8) the payment of dividends;
9) the award of damages to any aggrieved party.64
The Model Act provides extraordinary relief in Section 42 if the
court finds that the ordinary relief is inadequate or inappropriate.6 5
The court may order dissolution, unless the corporation or one or
more of its shareholders purchases, subject to special rules, all the
shares of the shareholders for their fair market value. 6
V. Judicial Questions Arising in States that Include Close-Corporation Provisions
Three interesting judicial questions arise in states that have enacted close-corporation provisions or have otherwise provided for dissolution or other relief based on "oppressive conduct. '6 7 First, how
should "oppressive conduct" be defined? Should the definition of
"oppression" apply to all corporations including for-profit, nonprofit, publicly-held and closely-held corporations? The statutory
phrase "oppressive conduct" may appear throughout a corporate
statute. The term may appear in provisions applicable to all corporations or in special provisions applicable only to close corporations.6 8
64. Id. § 41, at 1855.
65. Id. § 42 at 1856-1857.
66. MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION CLOSE CORPORATION SUPPLEMENT; §§ 40-42 and
Offical Comment.
67. Pennsylvania has enacted provisions for all corporations, non-profit corporations, and
certain closely held corporations. 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1981, 5981, and 1767 (West

1992); see also S.K. Miller, A Note on the Definition of Oppressive Conduct By Majority
Shareholders: How Can the Reasonable Expectation Standard Be Reasonably Applied in
Pennsylvania?, THE J.OF LAW AND COMMERCE UNIV. OF PITTSBURGH (1992).
68. See 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1981, 5981, and 1767 (West 1992). Section 1981
applies to all corporations and provides for involuntary dissolution where the acts of the directors, or those in control are illegal, oppressive or fraudulent and it is beneficial to the interest
of the shareholders that the corporation be would up and dissolved. Similarly, section 5981,
which is applicable to non-profit corporations, contains similar language and provides for an
additional ground for dissolution where the objects of the corporation have wholly failed, are
entirely abandoned, or their accomplishment is impracticable. Additionally, section 1767(a)(1)
applies to any shareholder of any business corporation and provides for the appointment of a
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Second, should the judicial standard of scrutiny of claims for
involuntary dissolutions be the same as that for other less drastic
equitable remedies, such as a custodianship or an accounting?
Third, if statutes have not enumerated the broad array of remedies outlined in the Model Close Corporation Supplement, should
the courts retain discretionary power to fashion alternative remedies
in addition to those enacted in the statute? Are statutory remedies
exclusive remedies, or do courts still retain broad equitable powers?
A. Should A Common Definition of Oppressive Conduct Apply To
All Types of Business Corporations?
The definition of "oppressive conduct," when used in a business
corporation statute, should apply to all types of corporations, including close corporations, publicly-held corporations, and non-profit corporations.6 9 Yet caution should be exercised in developing a common
standard. The enactment of close corporation provisions has been
driven by the need to protect minority shareholders of close corporations. 70 A common definition of oppression must provide sufficient
flexibility to address the special needs of the close corporation.71
The Official Comments to Section 40 of the Model Close Corporation Supplement do not attempt to define oppression, fraud, or unfairly prejudicial conduct. 72 The Comments note that these are elastic terms whose meanings vary with .the circumstances of the
particular case. Interpretive case law must provide sufficient guidelines for litigants.73
custodian upon the occurrence of certain conditions including cases where the acts of the directors or those in control are illegal oppressive or fraudulent. Finally, section 1767(a)(2) provides
for the appointment of a custodian where the corporation is closely-held and the directors or
those in control have acted illegally, oppressively, or fraudulently toward one or more five
percent holders or owners in their capacities as shareholders, directors, officers, or employees.
69. See supra note 67.
70. See MODEL CLOSE CORPORATION SUPPLEMENT § 41, at 1856 (1992) Official Comment (indicating "[tihe purpose of listing the types of relief available ... is to overcome the
reluctance some courts have shown in the past to ordering anything other than dissolution, or
possibly a buy-out.").
71. See, e.g., 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1767(a)(2) (West 1992) Amended Committee
Comment 1990 which provides valuable insight into the remedial purpose of the provision
which permits the appointment of a custodian in the event of deadlock, oppression, or certain
other situations. The Comment provides:
This new provision is intended to establish a statutory foundation for the development on a case-by-case basis of safeguards for incorporated partners in dealing with each other, rather than forcing the courts to distort the general rules of
corporate law in order to grant relief in closely held situations.
72. See MODEL CLOSE CORPORATION SUPPLEMENT § 40, at 1853.
73. Id. providing: "No attempt has been made to define oppression, fraud, or unfairly
prejudicial conduct. These are elastic terms whose meaning varies with the circumstances
presented in a particular case." See also 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1767(a)(2) (West 1992)

OPPRESSIVE CONDUCT

B. Should The Judicial Standard of Scrutiny Be The Same For
All Types of Remedies?
Traditionally, courts have been reluctant to provide relief from
oppressive conduct in the form of involuntary dissolution. Dissolution
has been widely regarded as a drastic remedy. 7 ' For instance, in
Pennsylvania different types of remedies are available, including involuntary dissolution applicable to all corporations, custodianship,
and special remedies for corporations that elect to be treated as close
corporations." While judicial restraint is appropriate for the remedy
standards are approof involuntary dissolution, more liberal judicial
7
priate in the case of close corporations. 1
Judicial restraint should be exercised in ordering dissolution.
Some commentators have argued that the question of dissolution of
closely-held corporations should be viewed with no more conservatism than that of partnerships. 77 Professor Latty, a noted commentator in the area of closely-held corporations has stated:
[T]here would seem, then, to be no reason under the new Act
for a court to approach the problem of liquidation of a close
corporation with substantially more conservatism that it would
show in dissolving a partnership, free from any carry-over of the
'sacred cow' tradition of corporate existence.7 8
One may argue that closely-held corporations are not partnerships,7 9' but instead are separate entities. Corporations are formed
Amended Committee Comment 1990 which indicates that special relief for close corporations
was intended to establish a statutory foundation for the development of a case by case basis for
safeguards for incorporated partners dealing with each other.
74. See Masinter v. Webco, 262 S.E.2d 433, 438-39 (1980) (indicating "it is implicit in
our statutory dissolution cases that dissolution is a severe remedy, since if granted, it will
terminate corporate life. Indeed, most courts have concluded that because of the drastic consequences of dissolution, less drastic alternatives should be fashioned if possible.").
75. See 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1981, 1767, and 2333 (West 1992).
76. See 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1767(a) (West 1992). The Amended Committee
Comment supports the view that the courts should be liberal in extending protection on a caseby-case basis in the development of safeguards for incorporated partners; see also CAL. CORP.
§ 1800(a)(5) (providing that in the case of any corporation with 35 or fewer shareholders
liquidation is reasonably necessary for the protection of the rights or interests of the complaining shareholder or shareholders).
77. See E.R. Latty, The Close Corporationand the New North Carolina Business Corporation Act, 34 N.C. L. REV. 432, 449-50 (1956), cited in Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307
S.E.2d 551, 561 (1983).
78. Id.
79. See Kisner v. Coffey, 418 So.2d 58, 61 (Miss. 1982). In reversing the lower court's
grant of a petition for dissolution sought by shareholders in a medical partnership, the Mississippi Supreme Court observed:
fallthough a showing of "imminent disaster is not required, liquidation is not
available upon a showing of mere vague apprehension of possible future mischief
or injury or to extricate minority stockholders from an investment which turns
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with the expectation that the corporate entity will continue to survive. While many close corporations are owned by a small number of
shareholders, others are owned by a larger number of shareholders.
Complex, formal structures exist for larger close corporations. Not
all close corporations are small, informal businesses. 80 The opportunity to obtain dissolution at will may be provided by election in bylaws in states which have enacted close corporation provisions or
other remedies.8 1 However, absent the election to seek close-corporation status, dissolution at-will may adversely affect other shareholders and the general public.82
In Baker v. Commercial Body Builders,83 the court noted the
compelling shareholder interest in the continuity of corporate life.
The court rejected the proposition that a close corporation is like a
partnership. The court stated that minority shareholders should have
the same right as a partner to demand dissolution. The court noted
that, "[a]fter all, the remedy of forced dissolution of a corporation
may be equally oppressive to the majority shareholders." 84
Chief Justice Traynor has also recognized the value of the continuity of corporate life. He has been sensitive to the drastic conse-

quences of dissolution, and has noted:
We . . . recognized that there is nothing sacred in the life of a
corporation that transcends the interests of its shareholders, but
because dissolution falls with such finality on those interests,
out to be a bad bargain. We also reject the concept that a "close corporation" is
like a partnership to the-extent that a minority shareholder should have the same
right as a partner to demand a dissolution of the business upon a substantially
the same showing as may be sufficient for the dissolution of a partnership. After
all, the remedy of a forced dissolution of a corporation may equally be "oppressive" to the majority stockholders.
80. R.W. Hillman, The Dissatisfied Participant in the Solvent Business Venture: A
Consideration of the Relative Permanence of Partnershipsand Close Corporations,67 MINN.
L. REV. 1, 87 notes:
There are a number of reasons why the free dissolvability thought to exist for
partnerships should not extend to close corporations. The breadth of the concept
of a close corporation undermines the ability to draw conclusions concerning the
nature of these enterprises and their comparability to partnerships. What may
be true for an enterprise consisting of two or three participants will not apply
with equal force as the number increases to ten, thirty, fifty, or more. There are
also structural differences between the two forms of organization which make a
close corporation something more than a partnership in a
corporate shell.
81. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
82. See R.H. Hillman, The Dissatisfied Participantin the Solvent Business Venture: A
Consideration of the Relative Permanence of Partnershipsand Close Corporations,67 MINN.
L REV. 1,at 75 (1982) (indicating in part that the reasonable expectation analysis improperly
ignores the expectations of participants other than the dissatisfied shareholder).
83. 507 P.2d 387 (Or. 1974).
84. Id. at 393.
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above all corporate powers it is subject to equitable limitations.8
The Model Close Corporation Act supports the view that a
court should have broad discretion in fashioning an appropriate remedy to resolve a shareholder dispute.8 6 While judicial restraint should
be exercised with respect to dissolution, a more liberal approach is
appropriate for less drastic remedies.87 In each situation, the circumstances should be scrutinized and the applicable statute and legislative history reviewed. The remedial purpose underlying the adoption
of close-corporation provisions supports a proactive judicial approach
in fashioning remedies for the minority shareholder. 8
In formulating remedies, corporate responsibility to non-shareholders should not be overlooked. The community-at-large may well
have an interest in the continuity of the corporation. Large and small
business enterprises can have a dramatic impact upon the environment and upon the health and welfare of the community.
C. Are Statutory Remedies Listed Exclusive?
The Model Act outlines nine remedies to provide relief to aggrieved shareholders.8 9 The question that arises is whether the remedies provided in close-corporation statutes are exclusive.
The Official Comments to the Model Act indicate that a court
should have broad discretion to fashion the most appropriate remedy
to resolve a dispute. What works in one case may not work in
another. 90
Courts should adopt a liberal approach in fashioning appropriate remedies, even if not expressly stated in the statute, particularly
when such remedies are less drastic than involuntary dissolution. 9 '
85. Jones v. H.F. Ahamanson & Co., 460 P.2d 464, 473 (Cal. 1969); see also Weisbecker v. Hosiery Patents, 51 A.2d 811 (Pa. 1947).
86. See Official Comment to § 41, 1992 MODEL CLOSE CORPORATION ACT ANN.,
MODEL CLOSE CORP. SUPPLEMENT at 1856 stating "[a] court should have broad discretion to
fashion the most appropriate remedy to resolve the dispute."
87. It is critical to review legislative history in selecting remedies pursuant to statutory
authority. In Pennsylvania, for example, certain provisions regarding custodianship were specifically designed to serve as remedial legislation to provide relief to minority shareholders. See
15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1767(a)(2) (West 1992) Amended Committee Comment 1990.
88. Id.
89. Id. at § 41 at 1855.
90. Id.
91. See Baker v. Commercial Builders, 507 P.2d 387, 395 (Or. 1973) in which the Supreme Court of Oregon takes such an approach, observing:
[iin any event, and as previously stated, while a showing of "oppressive conduct
may be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court under ORS 57.595, such a
showing does not require the court to exercise the power conferred upon it by
that statute to require either the dissolution of a corporation or any other alter-
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Of course, this determination must be made after considering the
specific statutory language at issue and the relevant legislative
history.9"
Some courts have interpreted statutory language that permits
involuntary dissolution on the basis of oppressive conduct to encompass not only involuntary dissolution, but also to include an array of
other less drastic remedies. For instance, in Baker v. Commercial
Body Builders,9" the Supreme Court of Oregon noted that courts are
not limited to the remedy of dissolution, but may consider a number
of other appropriate equitable remedies. 9' These alternatives include:
a) the requirement of a dissolution by a specific date;
b) the appointment of a receiver to continue the business for the
shareholder's benefit until differences are resolved;
c) the appointment of a special fiscal agent to report to the
court;
d) the retention of jurisdiction by the court without the appointment of a receiver or a special fiscal agent;
e) the ordering of an accounting;
f) the issuance of an injunction to prohibit oppressive conduct;
g) the ordering of a dividend or reduction of capital;
h) the ordering of the majority to purchase minority stock;
i) an order permitting the minority to purchase more stock;
j) an award of damages to the minority as compensation for injury from oppressive conduct. 95
It is noteworthy that the purpose of listing types of relief available
under the Model Act was to overcome the reluctance of some courts
to order remedies other than involuntary dissolutions.9 6
The judicial discretion exercised in Baker was followed by the
Supreme Court of North Dakota in Balvik v. Sylvester.97 The North
native equitable remedy. We thus come to the question of what, if any, other
remedies may be appropriate in such a case as an alternative to the forced dissolution of a corporation. We have already held . . . that in a suit under ORS
57.595 for "oppressive" conduct consisting of a "squeeze out" or "freeze out" in
a "close" corporation the courts are not limited to the remedy of dissolution, but
may, as an alternative, consider other appropriate equitable relief.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
92. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:12-7(l)(c) (1992) (a remedial statutory provision
permitting relief from oppressive conduct in the shareholders' capacity as shareholders, directors, officers, or employees); see also 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1767(a)(2) (1992) (containing a similar remedial directive to consider oppressive conduct in the shareholder's capacity as
shareholders, directors, officers, or employees).
93. 507 P.2d 387 (Or. 1973).
94. Id. at 395.
95. Id. at 395-96.
96. 507 P.2d 387, 395 (1974).
97. 411 N.W.2d 383, 388 (N.D. 1987).
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Dakota court followed courts which have interpreted their similar
statutory language to allow alternative equitable remedies not provided for in the statute. The Supreme Court of Alaska has also taken
the position that courts retain equitable discretion to fashion less
drastic remedies to fit the parties' situation.9 8
VI.

The Judicial Application

of the

Reasonable Expectation

Analysis
A.

Leading Case In New York

The judicial adoption of the expectation standard is best illustrated by a New York case, In re Kemp & Beatley (Gardstein),
Inc.99 In Kemp, two minority shareholders sought dissolution of a
98. Stefano v. Coppock, 705 P.2d 443, 446 (Alaska 1985); see also Masinter v. Webco
Co., 262 S.E.2d 433, 439 (W. Va. 1980) (noting that most states have adopted the view that a
dissolution statute does not provide the exclusive remedy for injured shareholders and that less
drastic alternatives should be fashioned if possible); see also Bahls, supra note 2, at 294 for an
excellent review of equitable remedies.
99. 473 N.E. 2d 1173 (N.Y. 1984). A number of cases decided after Kemp have gradually elaborated on the application of the reasonable expectation standard. See In re Wiedy's
Furniture Clearance Center Co., 487 N.Y.S.2d 901, 903 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985) (indicating
that mere disappointment in the results of a venture is not sufficient to justify dissolution); see
also In re Dubonnet Scarfs, 484 N.Y.S.2d 541, 544 (1985) (involving a shareholder whose
financial difficulties could not justify his demand to be bought out and then after refusal seek
action for dissolution); see Gunzberg v. Art Lloyd Metal Products Corp., 492 N.Y.S.2d 83,
85-86 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985) (indicating that a shareholder who has a long history of being
active in the business has reasonable expectations of continued employment and input into
management, and even if there were sound business reasons for some of the corporation's actions the ultimate beneficiary was the majority); In re Mintz (Astoria Holding Corp.), 493
N.Y.S.2d 488, 492 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985) (noting that a determination of oppressive conduct
can only be based on a determination of the full development of the facts and opportunity for
discovery); Petition of Levitt, 492 N.Y.S.2d 736, 741 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985) (noting that an
inactive shareholder's interest is in receiving the fair market value of shares and any other
result could enable the shareholder to use dissolution as a coercive tool); Landorf v. Glottstein
500 N.Y.S. 2d 494, 497 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986) (observing that a minority shareholder's basic
interest in the business is in active control of the business rather than passive investment in an
enterprise conducted by others); In re John Imperatore, 512 N.Y.S.2d 904, 905 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1987) (indicating that the shareholder who purchased a minority interest with the understanding he would be a salaried employee could reasonably expect employment to continue as
long as the corporation continues); In re Farega Realty Corporation, 517 N.Y.S.2d 610, 611 (
N.Y. App. Div. 1987) (indicating laxness in maintaining records, failure to regularly consult
petitioner and denial of access to records was not oppressive against a minority shareholder
who was a passive investor; In re Brach, 522 N.Y.S.2d 612, 613 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987) (involving situation where petitioner merely made allegations of dissatisfaction with management
which would not support a finding of oppressive conduct); In re Musilli, 523 N.Y.S.2d 120,
123 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987) (involving inactive minority shareholder whose legitimate goal
should be in securing the fair market value of the interest); Burack v. I. Burack Inc., 524
N.Y.S.2d 457, 460 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) (indicating the doctrine of unclean hands is not an
automatic bar to recovery but shareholder's acts made in bad faith and undertaken with a view
toward involuntary dissolution will bar dissolution); In re Smith, 546 N.Y.S.2d 382, 384 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1989) (indicating that after acquiescence in majority's exercise of control of day-today operation disappointment in not being voted onto board of directors should not be equated
with oppression, nor should failure to pay dividends in the absence of a policy to pay divi-
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corporation on the grounds of fraudulent and oppressive conduct by
the company's board of directors. 0 0
The corporation designed and manufactured table linens and
sundry tabletop items. 1' 0 The petitioners together owned 20.33% of
the corporation and had been long-time employees of the company.
One was fired and one resigned and neither received distributions of
earnings. Each petitioner viewed himself as being frozen out of the
company stock. The company had a long-standing policy of awarding de facto dividends. The company changed the dividend policy
either shortly before or shortly after petitioners' employment ended.
A new dividend policy was implemented, based on services rendered
2
0

rather than stock ownership.1

Affirming the lower court's decision, the New York Court of
Appeals held that the majority conduct constituted oppression. The
lower court, citing the severity of the remedy, conditioned its grant
of dissolution upon the corporation being permitted to purchase peti1
tioners' stock.

0 3

Section 1104a of New York's Business Corporation Law determined the outcome in Kemp.'04 Section 1104a provides for judicial
dissolution under special circumstances. Holders of 20 percent or
more of outstanding shares of privately held corporations may present a petition for dissolution if 1) the directors or those in control
have been guilty of illegal, fraudulent, or oppressive actions; or 2)
the property or assets are being looted, wasted, or diverted for pri10 5
vate use by the directors, officers, or those in control.
The New York statute contains provisions which operate as
safeguards for majority shareholders. In determining whether to
grant a dissolution, a court must consider the following: 1) whether
liquidation is the only feasible means whereby the petitioners may
reasonably expect fair market value on their investment; and, 2)
whether the liquidation of the corporation is reasonably necessary for
the protection of the rights and interests of any substantial number
of shareholders or petitioners. 106 Pursuant to Section 1118, every ordends); In re Schlacter, 546 N.Y.S.2d 891, 892 (1989) (indicating that spouse of terminated
employee at will could not reasonably expect ancillary benefits of spouse's continued
employment).
100. 473 N.E.2d 1173, 1176 (N.Y. 1984).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1180.
103. Id. at 1181.
104. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW 1104-a(b)(2) (McKinney 1992).
105. Id.
106. Id.
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der of dissolution must be conditioned upon permitting any shareholder to purchase the complaining shareholder's stock at fair market value.10 7
Considering the remedial purpose of the statute, the Court of
Appeals indicated that a complaining member's reasonable expectations are the appropriate measure of oppressive conduct. The court
embraced a case-by-case approach, stating that "it would be inappropriate to delineate the contours of the court's consideration in determining whether directors have been guilty of oppressive conduct.
As in other areas of the law, much will depend on the circumstances
in the individual case."1 8
The opinion fails to consider factors which should be considered
in determining the existence of oppressive conduct. However, the
court emphasized that statutory protection should not be afforded to
minority shareholders acting in bad faith to force an involuntary
dissolution.10 9
The Kemp decision was not a case of first impression in New
York in the use of the reasonable expectation standard for defining
oppressive conduct. Previously, in Matter of Topper v. Park Shera1
ton Pharmacy,'
it was held that oppressive conduct took place
where two controlling shareholders discharged the minority shareholder as an employee and officer thus severely damaging the share-

holder's "reasonable expectations.9'
B.

Judicial Interpretations In Other States

A number of other jurisdictions have embraced the reasonable
expectation standard. Montana, in Fox v. 7L Ranch Co." 2 addressed
the question of majority oppression and shareholder deadlock. In
Fox, failure to receive dividends or remuneration were among the
actions which revealed evidence of oppressive conduct. The court
recognized that there are a number of definitions of oppressive conduct, but cited the parties' expectations as the most important." 3
New Mexico has expressly adopted the reasonable expectation
107. Id. at § 1118.
108. In re Kemp, 473 N.E.2d at 1179.
109. Id. at 1180.
110. 433 N.Y.S.2d 359 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980).
111. Id. For an excellent discussion of Topper and the reasonable expectation test see
John E. Davidian, Corporate Dissolution in New York: Liberalizing the Rights of Minority
Shareholders, 56 ST. JOHNS L. REV. 24 (1981) (reviewing and critiquing the development of
New York legislation).
112. 645 P.2d 929 (Mont 1982).
113. Id. at 933.
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analysis. In McCauley v. Tom McCauley & Son, 1 a minority
shareholder was embroiled in a bitter divorce with her husband. The
petitioner was a minority shareholder in her husband's family business and was excluded from participation in the business. Relying on
the reasonable-expectation standard, the Court of Appeals of New
Mexico determined that the majority engaged in oppressive
conduct."'
The leading case in New Jersey regarding the definition of oppressive conduct is Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty." 6 In Exadaktilos, the plaintiff was one of four stockholders in a closely-held
corporation which owned and operated a restaurant." 7 The plaintiff
held a 20 percent interest in the corporation. The plaintiff's fatherin-law owned a 40 percent interest." 8 The plaintiff eventually divorced his wife" 9 and had difficulty in his relationships with the
other shareholders.' 2" After the plaintiff was fired from his job, he
instituted a suit for the
dissolution of the corporation or the appoint2
ment of a custodian.' '
The New Jersey statute permits a court to appoint a custodian
or a provisional director. The court may order the sale of the corporation's stock or order corporate dissolution in the case of a corporation having 25 or less shareholders. Dissolution can be ordered where
the directors or those in control have acted fraudulently or illegally,
or have mismanaged the corporation or abused their authority as officers or have acted oppressively or unfairly toward one or more mi22
nority shareholders.1
According to the New Jersey court, the starting point for the
determination of oppressive conduct is to be determined in reference
114. 724 P.2d 232 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986).
115. Id. at 237.
116. 400 A.2d 554 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1979), affid, 414 A.2d 994 (N.J. Super.
1980) (per curiam); see also Small v. Goldman, 637 F. Supp. 1030, 1032 (D.N.J. 1986) (indicating that the New Jersey statute attempts to prevent minority shareholders from being frozen into an inalienable equity interest and attempts to protect majority from disgruntled shareholders as well); see Kisner v. Coffey, 418 So.2d 58, 61 (Miss. 1982) (involving failure to reelect two doctors as directors after their withdrawal from a clinic and interference with deferred compensation was not oppressive, emphasizing that dissolution is an extraordinary remedy and noting that it may be equally oppressive to the majority shareholders).
117. 400 A.2d 554, 556 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1979).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 557 (indicating that petitioner and his wife were involved in divorce
proceedings).
120. Id. at 561 (evidence showing that the plaintiff failed to get along with employees,
causing a loss of personnel).
121. Id. at 561.
122. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:12-7 (West 1992); see also 400 A.2d 554 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Law Div. 1979).
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to the shareholders expectations.123 The court can decide whether
the controlling shareholders have acted contrary to the expectations
or have acted oppressively.124 In Exadaktilos, the expectations of the
parties were not established in the agreement, they had to be gleaned
from the circumstances surrounding the agreement.12 5
The court analyzed the circumstances regarding the plaintiff's
discharge of employment. Based on this review the court determined
that the discharge did not constitute oppressive action.12 6 The plaintiff conflicted with other employees, repeatedly quit without notice,
and had failed to learn the restaurant business. 2 ' According to the
court, the plaintiff's discharge was through no fault of the
defendant. 2 "
The New York and New Jersey courts have adopted similar approaches. The New Jersey approach as developed in Exadaktilos denies relief to the minority where the minority is the wrongdoer. Oppressive conduct does not include cases in which the minority's
expectations are frustrated but the minority's misconduct causes the
frustrated expectations.' 29 The Kemp decision would deny relief
when the minority shareholder's acts have given rise to the complained-of oppression, have been made in bad faith, and have been
130
undertaken with a view toward forcing involuntary dissolution.
VII. Why Oppressive Conduct Should Not be Exclusively Defined
as a Defeat of Reasonable Expectations
A significant advantage to the reasonable-expectation test is
that it provides a standard by which to judge what is oppressive or
unfair. In Exadaktilos, the court criticized prior, fault-based definitions of oppressive conduct for failing to provide any standard from
which to judge what is oppressive or unfair.'' However, the reasonable expectation standard fails to address a number of critical social
policy and practical business considerations.
A.

Larger Close-Corporations

The expectation test emerged as a means of addressing the
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

400 A.2d at 561.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 561-62.
Id. at 561.
400 A.2d at 561-62.
Id.
473 N.E.2d 1173, 1180 (N.Y. 1984).
400 A.2d 554, 560 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1979).
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problems of the minority shareholder in a set of specific circumstances. The standard was tailored to protect the minority shareholder of a small, closely-held business. Minority shareholders, referred to as "little people" by O'Neal, are regarded as lacking the
foresight, counsel, sophistication, or bargaining power to obtain con132
tractual protection.
The expectation standard is appropriate for a closely-held corporation owned and operated by a few individuals. It is not suitable
for large, non-publicly traded corporations. They may have numerous shareholders. The shareholders may hold a wide variety of corporate stock and have conflicting minority interests and expectations.
For example, assume that Mr. Alexander owns sixty-five percent of a corporation. The corporation bakes its own pies and also
purchases and resells pies made by others to distributors. The remaining thirty-five percent of the corporation is held by a number of
other minority shareholders. Assume that Ms. Malone and Mr.
Stone are each five percent owners. Ms. Malone's expertise is in
sales distribution and Mr. Stone's expertise is in baking. At the time
of their investment, they reasonably expected to remain employed
and reasonably expected both lines of the business to flourish. Fifteen years later, Mr. Alexander decides to expand distribution and
discontinue baking. He stops paying dividends.. Mr. Stone is fired.
Should Mr. Stone be permitted the appointment of a custodian
or be granted an involuntary dissolution of the corporation, because
of oppressive conduct occasioned by his defeated expectations? What
about Ms. Malone's minority interest? Once outside of the "mom
and pop" operation, the expectation standard fails to address the
complexities of competing, minority-shareholder interests. If a court
enforces the reasonable expectations of one minority-shareholder, it
may defeat the reasonable expectations of another minority
shareholder.
It is noteworthy that under Kemp the New York statute, as
written, directs the court to consider the interests of shareholders in
determining whether to proceed with an involuntary dissolution.13
Section 1104-1(b) directs the court to consider "whether liquidation
of the corporation is reasonably necessary for the protection of the
rights and interests of any substantial number of shareholders of the
132. See F. Hodge O'Neal, Close Corporations: Existing Legislation and Recommended Reform, 33 THE BUSINESS LAWYER 873, 884 (1978).
133. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW. § I104-a(b)(2) (McKinney 1992).
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petitioners." 13 However, in cases involving substantial numbers of
shareholders of close corporations, not all statutes include this builtin protection.
B.

The Question of Social Responsibility

As currently formulated, the reasonable-expectation standard
and resulting judicial remedies fail to consider social responsibility in
the determination of whether to grant an involuntary dissolution
based on oppressive majority conduct. For instance, a "closely-held
corporation produces a product which causes pollution. Alternatively, assume the corporation manufactures a medical device, for
internal use, which affects the health of the public. If minority
shareholders have a dispute with the majority and the minority's reasonable expectations are defeated, should a dissolution be granted?
The exclusive use of the reasonable-expectation test for determining
corporate dissolution ignores the corporation's social responsibilities.
C.

Business Purpose

The court in Kemp would deny relief to a minority shareholder
seeking dissolution in bad faith.13 5 Mere disappointment in operating
results is not sufficient to constitute oppressive conduct. .In order for
conduct to be oppressive under the reasonable-expectation standard,
the majority conduct must substantially defeat expectations that, objectively viewed, were reasonable and central to the decision to join
the venture. 36
An important question is whether oppressive conduct exists
when the majority is furthering legitimate business purpose. If there
is a valid business purpose for the alleged oppressive conduct, should
the petitioner be denied relief even though his expectations were
frustrated? Assume, for example, that the majority makes a valid
business decision not to pay dividends and to expand one line of business and not another. If a minority shareholder has frustrated expectations and has not contributed to this frustration, can the minority
shareholder maintain an action for custodianship, dissolution or a
134. See 473 N.E.2d 1173, 1177 n.1 (1984). Note that some state statutes such as
Pennsylvania's consider the effects of dissolution on various groups of shareholders but do not
contain similar protective language with respect to custodianship provisions for close corporations under Section 1767 of the statute. See 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1981 (1992) and
contrast to § 1981 authorizing dissolutions applicable to all corporations, not just close
corporations.
135. See supra note 53.
136. In re Wiedy's Furniture Clearance Center, 487 N.Y.S.2d 901, 903 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1985).
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similar remedy? What if obtaining a principle role in the line of business that was discontinued was central to the minority shareholder's
desire to join the venture? O'Neal refers to the reasonable expectations of the shareholder as they exist at the inception of the enterprise, and as they develop thereafter. 137 Are minority expectations
that conflict with the majority's legitimate business purposes unreasonable? Does business purpose or business judgment affect the
analysis? 138
A Massachusetts court has eloquently described the controlling
shareholder's need for flexibility in operating a business and in making strategic decisions:
Therefore, when minority stockholders in a close corporation
bring suit against the majority alleging a breach of strict good
faith duty owed to them by the majority, we must carefully analyze the action taken by the controlling stockholders in the individual case. It must be asked whether the controlling group can
demonstrate a legitimate business purpose for its action ....
In asking this questioh, we acknowledge the fact that the controlling group in a close corporation must have some room to
maneuver in establishing the business policy of the corporation.
It must have a large measure of discretion, for example, in declaring or withholding dividends, deciding whether to merge or
consolidate, establishing salaries of corporate officers, dismissing
directors with or without cause, and hiring and firing corporate
employees. When an asserted business purpose for their action is
137. F. Hodge O'Neal, Close Corporations: Existing Legislation and Recommended
Reform, 33 THE BUSINEss LAWYER 873, 886 (1978).
138. The question of whether the business judgment rule should be applied in the context of close corporations has been addressed by some commentators. See S.C. Bahls, Resolving Shareholder Dissension: Selection of the Appropriate Equitable Remedy, 15 THE J. OF
CORP. LAW 285, 292 (1990) indicating:
[uinfortunately, two legal doctrines historically have served as barriers to removing inefficient or incompetent management. The first is the Majority Rule Doctrine. A second and related legal doctrine is the Business Judgment Rule. As a
result, the business judgment rule creates thorny problems of proof of the minority shareholder bringing a suit for breach of a directors duty of care.
Bahls cites one commentator, Chittur, Resolving Close Corporation Conflicts: A Fresh Approach, 10 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 129, 167-71 (1987) who expressed concern that the
Business Judgment Rule unduly protects corporate management. Id. at 155. Chittur suggested
shifting the burden of proof to the majority to show business necessity. Bahls suggests that
rather than shifting the burden of proof the court use their broad equitable pokers to protect
reasonable expectations. Id. Equitable powers were thus used in Gunzberg v. Art-Lloyd Metal
Products Corp., 492 N.Y.S.2d 83, 86 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985) (involving minority shareholders
who successfully obtained an involuntary dissolution on the basis of oppressive conduct by
majority shareholders who were fired from their long-standing positions. The court employed
the reasonable expectation standard and noted "[e]ven if there were sound business reasons for
the corporation's actions, it is clear that the ultimate beneficiary was Arthur (the controlling
shareholder), not petitioners."). Id.
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advanced by the majority, however, we think it is open to the
minority stockholders to demonstrate that the same legitimate
objective could have been achieved through an alternative course
of action less harmful to the minority's interest.13 9
The Kemp decision fails to define the contours of the reasonable-expectation standard, leaving unresolved the question whether
such business considerations will be incorporated into the reasonableexpectation standard.140
D. A Poor Bargain or Majority Oppression?
The judicial standard for oppressive conduct should distinguish
between a case involving the defeat of reasonable expectations and
the case involving the disappointment of minority shareholders who
have entered into a bad bargain. 41 The case of a disappointed minority shareholder who is an employee is particularly troublesome. 4 2
For instance, Ms. Signore is an unrelated employee in a family
business. She owns a ten percent minority interest in the corporation.
Ms. Signore executes a buy-out agreement with the majority which
permits the majority to purchase Ms. Signore's shares upon termination of employment for any reason. The parties agree that the minority shareholder will receive reasonable dividends, but will have a
limited role in any significant expansion of the business. Employment
is not for a specified term and is at-will. On several occasions, Ms.
Signore attempted unsuccessfully to get an employment agreement
for a specified term.
Assume further that Ms. Signore was the manager of the corporation for fifteen years and was a key employee. She received generous dividends while she was a shareholder. However, the majority
shareholder decided to replace Ms. Signore with his daughter. The
company therefore fired Ms. Signore and the majority purchased her
stock.
On one level, Ms. Signore received the benefit of her bargain
but the bargain was a poor one. Does the conduct by the majority
constitute the defeat of reasonable expectations amounting to oppres139. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 663 (1976) (citations
omitted).
140. 473 N.E.2d 1173 (N.Y. 1984).
141. See Kisner v. Coffey, 418 So.2d 58, 61 (Miss. 1982) (stating that liquidation is not
available to extricate minority shareholders from an investment that turns out to be a bad
bargain).
142. See Ingle v. Glamore Motor Sales Inc., 535 N.E.2d 1311 (N.Y. 1989) (involving
an at will shareholder/employee who challenged his termination and repurchase of stock pursuant to a shareholders' agreement).
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sive conduct? Are expectations of continued employment reasonable
under these facts? Perhaps courts should employ contract law concepts to provide remedial relief to the minority. If Ms. Signore had
been given repeated assurances of continued employment, perhaps a
good case of oppressive conduct would be presented and the equities
would be on her side. However, if the basis of Ms. Signore's bargain
was indeed limited, she may have simply entered a poor bargain and
has no legitimate expectations which were defeated.
Some states, such as New Jersey and Pennsylvania, contain
statutory language that addresses cases when the majority has acted
illegally, oppressively, or fraudulently toward certain minority shareholders in their capacities as shareholders, directors, officers, or
employees. 113
The courts must balance the interests of minority shareholders
against the majority's interest in making business decisions and limiting the minority shareholder's power. Several cases support the
view that a shareholder or employee may reasonably expect continued employment. As indicated above, Pennsylvania and New Jersey
statutes protect minority shareholders in their capacity as employees.""' An overly broad interpretation of business purpose could undermine the reasonable-expectation standard and defeat the remedial purpose of close-corporation legislation. In contrast, an
expansive interpretation of the reasonable-expectation test could interfere with legitimate business decisions. An overly broad application of the reasonable-expectation test unfairly prejudices the rights
of majority shareholders who have a contractual relationship with
minority shareholders. Majority shareholders may have exercised
good faith and incurred substantial legal fees in defining their relationship with minority shareholders.
E. A Substance Over Form Analysis
The Kemp decision creates some uncertainty in the law because
143. See 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1767(a)(2); see also JOHN W. MCLAMB, JR. AND
WENDY C. SHIBA. PENNSYLVANIA CORPORATION LAW PRACTICE, § 5.8. at 265, n.264 (1991)
(noting the similarities between the New Jersey and Pennsylvania provisions).
144. Id. See Gunzbuerg v. Art Lloyd Metal Products Corp., 492 N.Y.S.2d 83, 85-86
(N.Y. App. Div. 1985); but see Ingle v. Glamore Motor Sales, 535 N.E. 183 (1989) (indicating that in a suit for damages for breach of fiduciary duty and for wrongful interference with
employment there was no fiduciary-rooted protection from being fired. The case involved an at
will employee whose termination resulted in the triggering of a buy-out provision. The dissent
raised the argument that the shareholder/employee had a reasonable expectation of continued
employment. The case did not present a question of dissolution, however, but of damages.
Nevertheless, the dissent raises interesting policy questions as to the extension of the reasonable expectation test into the arena of suits for damages by at will employees.).
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it fails to define the contours of the reasonable-expectation test. The
remedial purpose of close-corporation statutes expressly calls for
flexibility and the exercise of discretion to protect minority shareholders. Nevertheless establishing basic guidelines will make the expectation test more conducive to pre-planning efforts by
shareholders. 14 5
It is critical that majority and minority shareholders be afforded
a degree of certainty that shareholder agreements will control the
breadth of the majority and minority relationship. When such agreements are executed in good faith with the intention that they establish the entire agreement between the parties, the agreements should
be the primary, not exclusive, source for defining the bargain between the parties.
While shareholder agreements should be given great weight,
courts should not ignore shareholder majority conduct or the shareholder relationships. Relationship as reflected in agreements may be
deceptive. The substance of the relationship and the actual conduct
may reflect majority oppression.14 6
In Gregory v. Helvering,147 the U.S. Supreme Court established
the principle that a transaction which complies with the letter of the
law may nevertheless violate its spirit." 8 One commentator noted:
Although Gregory may mean all things to all people its essence
is an instinctive judicial attitude that a transaction should not be
given effect for tax purposes unless it serves a purpose other
than tax avoidance. Thus, a transaction heavily laden with tax
avoidance motives may be disregarded as a sham, or its form
may be recast so as to reflect its economic substance, or interdependent steps in a single transaction may be collapsed in order
to prevent over-reaching by the taxpayers from doing indirectly
145. See In re Kemp & Beatley (Gardstein) Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1173, 1179 (N.Y. 1984)
(expressly failing to delineate the contours of the courts' consideration in determining whether
directors have been guilty of oppressive conduct); see also S.C. Bahls, Resolving Shareholder
Dissension: Selection of the Appropriate Equitable Remedy, 15 THE J. OF CORPORATION
LAw 285, 326 (1990) (suggesting the use of an alternative standard of fair dealing or fiduciary
duty in evaluating the expectations of a son, daughter, ex-spouse, or other transferee of a
minority interest); see also suggested limitations in applying the reasonable expectation standard by R.W. Hillman, The Dissatisfied Participant in the Solvent Business Venture: A Consideration of the Relative Permanence of Partnershipsand Close Corporations, 67 MINN. L.
REV. 1, 1182 (recommending limitations on the expectation analysis).
146. See Justice Martin's concurring opinion in Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d
551, 573 (N.C. 1983) (indicating that in making the determination of whether plaintiff's condition is a result of oppression or bad conduct by the other shareholders, the court will consider
the substance of the conduct rather than its form).
147. 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
148. Id.
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what they cannot do directly.14 9

The need to clarify the substance of a transaction, as opposed to
the legal form, has application to shareholder agreements governing
the majority-minority relationship. While formal contractual author-

ization may exist for certain majority conduct, the majority conduct,
in substance, may be oppressive."'
Assume, for example, that Mr. Kramer is the majority stockholder of Kramer Fruit, Inc., a wholesale fruit and produce business.
The business buys fruit and produce wholesale and delivers the products to a variety of small restaurants and grocery stores. Mr. Sherman is the manager and a fifteen percent shareholder. A written
shareholder agreement is executed. The agreement states that Mr.
Sherman is employed at-will. It emphasizes that the parties under-

stand that Mr. Sherman's participation is limited to participation in
the Kramer, Inc. business. Mr. Sherman is not entitled to participate

in any other ventures of the majority shareholder.
Further assume that the business of Kramer Fruit, Inc. thrives
largely because of Mr. Sherman's salesmanship and organizational
skills. Mr. Kramer incorporates another business, Kramer Fruit and

Fruit Baskets, Inc. This business is in the same location and is distinguished only by the fact that it provides an additional service of selling fruit baskets. The fruit basket line of business is a de minimus
part of the operations, representing less than one percent of revenues. Kramer Fruit and Fruit Baskets begins to attract the custom-

ers of Kramer Fruit. Mr. Sherman is not fired and receives dividends, but the business of Kramer Fruit declines largely because of
the competition from Kramer Fruit and Baskets.
149.

BORIS I. BITTKER & JAMES S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORAat 14-170 (fifth ed. 1987).
150. See Justice Hancock's dissenting opinion in Ingle v. Glamore Motor Sales Inc., 535
N.E.2d 1311, 1317 (N.Y. 1989) which poignantly illustrates the manner in which a contractual buy-out provision can operate harshly with respect to a minority shareholder, providing:
[p]laintiff alleges that he became sales manager of Glamore Motor Sales in
1964 and later a co-owner of the business as a means of achieving his objective
of becoming a franchised Ford dealer in the Long Island area; that from 1966
until 1982 he ran the business, supervising, and hiring and firing the employees
and making day-to-day business decisions; that by terminating him from his position at Glamore Sales at the age of 61 and forcing him out of the business
through exercise of the purchase option, the majority not only deprived him of
his continued employment and salary as an executive, director, and manager of
the business, but denied him "opportunity to realize some profit on [his] investment" and precluded him "from all the benefits and equities [he] had built up
through years of devotion and dedication to the business;" and that he would
never have made the sacrifices and invesiments of time, effort and money in the
business had he known that the buy-back provision would be interpreted to make
him subject to summary firing at the whim of the co-owner.
TIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS
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In the above scenario, would Mr. Kramer's conduct be oppressive? If we look only at the form of the shareholder agreement there
is no violation of expectations, since technically Mr. Sherman retains
employment and still receives dividends. In the shareholder agreement Mr. Kramer excludes Mr. Sherman from other ventures. Nevertheless, Mr. Kramer may be completing a minority squeeze-out.
The use of a substance-over-form analysis is useful in such
cases. This approach enables courts to identify underhanded minority squeeze-outs which are in substance contrary to the original intentions of the parties.
F. The Failure to Address The Plaintiff Without Reasonable
Expectations
Should the reasonable-expectation test be the exclusive test of
oppressive conduct? What continuing role if any, should the traditional fault-based approach take in establishing oppressive conduct?
In Gimple v. Bolstein,16 the Supreme Court of Queens County
had to determine whether the majority had acted oppressively in
freezing out a minority shareholder. The shareholder acquired stock
by gift and bequest from his father and also embezzled from the
corporation.1 5 2 The minority's reasonable expectations were not defeated. 1 3 According to the court, the shareholder could only expect
ostracism and prosecution.15 4 Nevertheless, the court resorted to the
alternative test of oppression, based on whether the conduct is burdensome, harsh and wrongful, lacking in probity and fair dealing,
and a violation of fair play.1 55
Should the plaintiff who is at fault have no remedy? The court
in Gimple observed that the two approaches were not mutually exclusive and are frequently equivalent.1 6 Since Gimple was decided
shortly before Kemp, it is not entirely clear whether the New York
courts will continue to employ the Gimple approach of using both
the reasonable-expectations standard and the traditional fault-based
approach.1 57
151. 477 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984).
152. Id.at 1017.
153. Id. at 1020.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1019.
157. See In re Kemp & Beatley, (Gardstein) Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1173, 1179 (N.Y. 1984)
(holding that a complaining shareholders "reasonable expectations" as a means of identifying
and measuring conduct alleged to be oppressive is appropriate). It is noteworthy that the
Kemp decision makes no mention of the use of a standard which is alternative to the reasona-
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The Need to Integrate Business Purpose, Ethics, and Social

Responsibilities in a Test of Oppressive Conduct
The distinction between the fault-based standard and the expectation test is misleading. 158 As courts have applied the reasonableexpectation standard they have considered the equities of the case,
fiduciary duties, and the conduct of the parties.15 9
Exclusive employment of the reasonable-expectation test fails to

balance ethical considerations in evaluating majority and minority
conduct. In today's business environment, ethical considerations and
a sense of social responsibility should be an integral part of doing
business. Ethical considerations should be reflected in legal standards
regarding majority conduct. The reasonable-expectation test should
not be employed exclusively, or in a reflexive manner. One recent
case in Pennsylvania, for instance, adopted the reasonable-expectation test without any analysis of the legal standard.'" 0 Ethical con-,

siderations may be minimized as courts ignore the conduct of majority shareholders and consider instead the bargain struck between the

parties.
A different approach to defining "oppressive conduct" is to combine the traditional fault-based approach with the reasonable-expectation standard. Under this hybrid approach the test of oppressive
conduct would be based on whether there has been burdensome,
harsh, and wrongful conduct violating standards of fair dealing and
fair play on which every shareholder should be entitled to rely in
ble expectation approach. See also Gee v. Blue Stone Heights Hunting Club, 604 A.2d 1141,
1144-45 (Pa. Commw. 1992) (following Kemp and adopting the reasonable expectation analysis as the measure of oppressive conduct); but see Fox v. 7L Bar Ranch Co., 645 P.2d 929, 933
(Mont. 1982) (recognizing that there are a number of definitions of oppressive conduct found
in case law, and that generally it is agreed that courts will proceed on a case-by-case basis).
158. Even under an exclusive application of the reasonable expectation analysis the
court will consider the actions of the minority shareholder and whether such actions are made
in bad faith. The use of the concept of bad faith reflects an incorporation of fault in the
reasonable expectation analysis. See In re Kemp & Beatley, (Gardstein) Inc., 473 N.E.2d
1173, 1180 (N.Y. 1984) in which the court indicates: "[tiherefore, the minority shareholder
whose own acts, made in bad faith and undertaken with a view toward forcing an involuntary
dissolution, give rise to the complained of oppression should be given no quarter in the statutory protection."
159. See Justice Martin's concurring opinion in Meiselman v. Meiselman, 507 S.E.2d
551, 573 (N.C. 1983). Justice Martin notes:
[o]ppression in this context is close to a breach of fiduciary duty. The West
Virginia Supreme Court, in a "reasonable expectations" case, analyzed oppression from the point of view of breach of fiduciary duty. It held that oppressive
conduct in a close corporation is closely related to the fiduciary duty of good
faith and fair dealing owed by majority stockholders to minority stockholders.
Masinter v. Webco Co., 262 S.E.2d 433 (W. Va. 1980). See also Fox v. 7L Bar Ranch Co.,
645 P.2d 929 (Mont. 1982).
160. Gee v. Blue Stone Heights Hunting Club, 604 A.2d 1141 (Pa. Commw. 1992).
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entrusting money to a corporation. Whether misconduct exists would
be based on a consideration of all the facts and circumstances, taking the following factors into account:
a) the nature of the majority's conduct;
b) the motive of the majority's conduct;
c) the nature of the minority's conduct;
d) the nature of the damages sustained by the minority;
e) the status of the corporation as a public or closely-held entity
and the shareholder's relationship to the corporation and to
other shareholders;
f) whether the minority shareholder held reasonable expectations which were substantially defeated by the majority's action
or inaction as reflected by the express or implied agreements;
g) whether, looking beyond the form of the relationship to its
substance,there is a pattern of conduct evidencing an intent to
squeeze-out the minority shareholder from the participation in
corporate life which was reasonably contemplated by the parties;
h) standards of ethical conduct. 1
While not part of this analysis, social policy considerations
should not be ignored. If the business has an impact on health or the
environment, the remedy of dissolution should be evaluated after
consideration of these factors. The resolution of a private dispute between shareholders may have a dramatic impact on the public.
To provide some guidance to shareholders, a series of acts
should be presumed to indicate the existence of oppressive conduct.
However, the existence of such acts should not be dispositive. Acts
which may be considered to be indicative of oppressive conduct
include:
a) the withholding of dividends from the minority;
b) the restriction or preclusion of employment;
c) the making of excessive payments to majority shareholders;
d) withholding important information on the operation of the
corporation;
e) procedural violations with regard to corporate management;
f) depriving the minority of a meaningful role in corporate decision-making;
g) making deceptive or manipulative business plans that deprive
the minority of the minority's rightful share of corporate
161.
(SECOND)

relations.

This approach is not entirely dissimilar to the approach taken by RESTATEMENT
TORTS § 767 (1977) with regard to the intentional interference with contractual
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Reference to relevant codes of ethics should be made in deter'
mining the meaning of "fair dealing" and "fair play."163
Standards
of business practice are also relevant.""
The impact on other minority shareholders should be considered
in determining whether dissolution or other remedies should be
granted. The shareholder's relationship to other shareholders and the
shareholder's role in the corporation should not be overlooked, particularly in the case of larger, close corporations with competing minority shareholder groups.
The courts should have equitable powers to fashion remedies
which are less severe than corporate dissolution. 6 5 As indicated
above, when fashioning remedies, the courts should consider the impact of alternatives upon stakeholders in the business other than individual shareholders. For close corporations with a large number of
employees, the effects on the community at large can be quite significant. Corporate size alone, however, does not dictate social responsibility. The corporation's social responsibility and the impact of its
social dissolution depend on the type of business. 16 6 Small corporations also may have a substantial effect on the community. Small
corporations may engage in operations that affect the environment,
health, and welfare of the community. 16 7 The courts should consider
the social obligations of corporations in the determining appropriate
162. See Orchard v. Covelli, 590 F. Supp. 1548, 1557 (W.D. Pa. 1984) (outlining various tactics typically employed to effect a minority squeeze-out).
163. This approach may assist in the development of a perspective from which to judge
oppressive conduct and responds to the criticism that a fault-based approach fails to provide a
perspective from which to judge oppressive conduct. See Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty
Co., 400 A.2d 554, 560 (N.J. Super. 1979) (providing that the terminology employed by both
the statute and the case law fails to suggest any perspective from which to judge what is
oppressive or unfair).
164. It is suggested that reference to ethical considerations or social norms in a business
setting may assist in providing a meaningful perspective from which to judge what is oppressive or unfair.
165. See Bahls, supra note 2, at 320 (Bahls suggests that when selecting remedies courts
should measure the remedy against three standards: "1) the remedy should maximize the ability of the minority to realize their reasonable expectations; 2) the remedy should minimize
administrative costs associated with resolving the dissension; [and] 3) the remedy should maximize the value of the economic unit while allowing shareholders to realize value in accordance
with their reasonable expectations." Bahls also suggests that before the courts protect expectations of shareholders they should find that the purchaser's expectations were known and became the basis for the purchase. He points out that a court order to fulfill expectations which
were not part of the bargain may impose an undue burden on majority shareholders. Id. at
326.
166. See supra notes 132-34.
167. See supra note 23.
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remedies. 168
This type of analysis accomplishes several goals. First, it employs an objective standard of fair conduct, with reference to codes
of ethics or other relevant standards. In so doing, the test provides a
perspective from which to judge oppressive conduct. The court in
Exadaktilos perceived that such a perspective was lacking under the
traditional fault-based approach."6 9
A test that incorporates business ethics encourages the development of business ethics. Further, it embraces the concept of fiduciary
duty owed by majority shareholders to minority shareholders. This
approach also integrates the concept of a corporation's social
responsibility.
Other areas of the law use proper business conduct to define a
legal standard. The Uniform Commercial Code employs the concept
of "usage of trade." 7 The tort of intentional interference with contractual relations is another example in which a legal standard is
based on improper conduct. In determining whether there is an intentional interference with contractual relations, "1 Section 767 of
Restatement (Second) of Torts determines "improper conduct"
based on:
a) the nature of the actor's conduct;
b) the actor's motive;
c) the interest of the other with which the actor's conduct
interferes;
d) the interest sought to be advanced by the actor;
e) the social interests in protecting the freedom of action of the
actor and the contractual interest of the other;
f) the proximity or remoteness of the actor's conduct to the
interference;
g) the relations between the parties; and
h) relevant considerations to the community at large. " 2
Thus, there are well-established legal standards that rely upon
the notion of proper conduct in a business setting. In cases such as
tortious interference with contractual relations, standards of business
73
conduct is a critical consideration.1
168. See supra note 23.
169. 400 A.2d 554, 560 (N.J. Super. 1979).
170. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-205 (1989).
171. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 (1977).
172. Id. at 767. It should be noted that statutory changes may be appropriate in certain
cases to implement this integrated approach.
173. See Adler, et. al. v. Epstein, 393 A.2d 1175 (Pa. 1978), appeal dismissed, certiorari denied, 442 U.S. 907 (1979) (involving a case where attorneys were liable for tortious
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This test considers whether the majority conduct at issue is justified by a legitimate business purpose. The minority's role in causing the conflict or disagreement is also relevant.
Finally, the above approach offers a cohesive, unified mode of
analysis, which is flexible and yet provides the framework for the
development of coherent judicial precedents. This approach establishes factors for defining oppressive conduct that provide additional
guidance,'but are not dispositive. Most importantly, the proposed integrated approach incorporates ethical considerations, business purpose, and social responsibility which should not be overlooked in today's business environment.

interference with a contractual relation where they had violated the code of professional responsibility relating to the proscription against self-recommendation by sending letters to former clients informing them of the existence of their newly-formed law firm).

